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On April 29, 2011 Bill S-9 came into force. This Bill 
amended the Criminal Code to create a separate 
punishment for theft of motor vehicle. Unlike the 
punishment for “regular” theft found in s. 334 of the 
Criminal Code, the punishment for theft of motor 
vehicle contains a mandatory minimum jail 
sentence of six months if the charges are proceeded 
by indictment and it is the person’s third or 
subsequent conviction. The new provision reads:
Motor vehicle theft
333.1 (1) Everyone who commits theft is, if the 
property stolen is a motor vehicle, guilty of an 
offence and liable
(a) on proceedings by way of indictment, to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 
years, and to a minimum punishment of 
imprisonment for a term of six months in the 
case of a third or subsequent offence under this 
subsection; or
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for 
a term of not more than 18 months.
Subsequent offences
(2) For the purpose of determining  whether a 
convicted person has committed a third or 
subsequent offence, an offence for which the 
person was previously convicted is considered 
to be an earlier offence whether it was 
prosecuted by indictment or by way of summary 
conviction proceedings.
In determining  whether it was a third or subsequent 
offence only convictions under the new s. 333.1 
apply. Previous theft convictions under s. 334 of the 
Criminal Code where the subject matter of the theft 
was a motor vehicle do not qualify. 
A new crime of “tampering  with vehicle 
identification number” was also added. This offence 
makes it illegal to alter, remove, or obliterate a 
motor vehicle ‘s VIN:
353.1 (1) Every person commits an offence who, 
without lawful excuse, wholly or partially alters, 
removes or obliterates a vehicle identification 
number on a motor vehicle.
Definition of “vehicle identification number”
(2) For the purpose of this section, “vehicle 
identification number” means any number or 
other mark placed on a motor vehicle for the 
purpose of distinguishing  it from other similar 
motor vehicles.
Exception
(3) Despite subsection (1), it is not an offence to 
wholly or partially alter, remove or obliterate a 
vehicle identification number on a motor vehicle 
during  regular maintenance or any repair or 
other work done on the vehicle for a legitimate 
purpose, including a modification of the vehicle.
Punishment
(4) Every person who commits an offence under 
subsection (1)
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not more than five 
years; or
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on 
summary conviction.
These new offences apply prospectively, meaning 
charges under these sections can only be laid if the 
offence was committed on or after the day the 
provisions came into force.  
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are 
authored by Mike Novakowski, MA, LLM. The 
articles contained herein are provided for 
information purposes only and are not to be 
construed as legal or other professional 
advice. The opinions expressed herein are not 
necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute 
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Novakowski at mnovakowski@jibc.ca.
Continued from cover. “Motor vehicle” is defined in 
s. 2 of the Criminal Code as meaning  “a vehicle that 
is drawn, propelled or driven by any means other 
than muscular power, but does not include railway 
equipment.” There are several other Criminal Code 
offences specifically mentioning  motor vehicles. 
These include:
✴ s. 94 - Unauthorized possession of a firearm, 
prohibited weapon, or restricted weapon in a 
motor vehicle
✴ s. 98 - Break and enter a motor vehicle to steal 
a firearm
✴ s. 213 - Stopping a motor vehicle for the 
purpose of engaging in prostitution
✴ s. 244.2 - Discharging a firearm into or at a 
motor vehicle
✴ s. 249 - Dangerous operation of a motor vehicle
✴ s. 249.1 - Flight from police while operating a 
motor vehicle
✴ s. 249.4 - Dangerous operation of a motor 
vehicle while street racing
✴ s. 253(a) - Operate motor vehicle while 
impaired
✴ s. 253(b) - Operate motor vehicle over 80 mg%
✴ s. 259 - Operate motor vehicle while 
disqualified
✴ s. 335 - Take motor vehicle without consent
✴ s. 335 - Occupant of motor vehicle knowing it 
was taken without consent
✴ s. 351 - Possess motor vehicle break-in 
instrument
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
most recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Becoming  a master manager:  a competing  values 
approach.
Robert E. Quinn ... [et al.].
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, c2011.
HD 57.7 B43 2011
Career flow: a hope-centered  approach to career 
development.
Spencer G. Niles, Norman E. Amundson, Roberta A. 
Neault.
Boston, MA: Pearson, c2011.
HF 5381 N548 2011
Cite right: a quick guide to citation styles - MLA, 
APA, Chicago, the sciences, professions, and 
more.
Charles Lipson.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
PN 171 F56 L55 2011
Communication essentials.  Speaking  essentials. 
[videorecording]
Hamilton, NJ: Films for the Humanities & Sciences; 
Orangeville, ON: McIntyre Media [distributor], 
c2010. videodisc (DVD) (20 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
This program shows students ways to overcome the 
fear of public speaking  and transform it into positive 
energy. These include thorough preparation (from 
learning  the wants and needs of the audience to 
scoping  out the location at which the speech will 
take place) as well as starting  with a strong  opener, 
f ind ing  the r igh t pace , us ing  nonverba l 
communication, and more.
BF 637 C45 C6648 2010 D1147
Communication essentials.  Reading essentials. 
[videorecording]
Hamilton, NJ: Films for the Humanities & Sciences; 
Orangeville, ON: McIntyre Media [distributor], 
c2010. videodisc (DVD) (20 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
With simple methods for tackling  an immense 
volume of content, this program helps students 
manage workplace reading  tasks quickly and 
ef f ic ient ly without overlooking  important 
information. Featured tips show viewers how to stay 
focused, prioritize reading  matter, and create a 
comfortable reading  environment, while making  the 
best use of tables of contents, indexes, sub-headings, 
and more.
BF 637 C45 C6647 2010 D1146
Communication essentials.  Writing  essentials. 
[videorecording]
Hamilton, NJ: Films for the Humanities & Sciences; 
Orangeville, ON: McIntyre Media [distributor], 
c2010. videodisc (DVD) (20 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
This program shows how effective written 
communication is possible for anyone, even those 
who struggle to complete a simple fax or e-mail. 
Methods for improvement include gauging  the needs 
of the reader, keeping  prose short and simple, 
emphasizing  benefits, avoiding  jargon and 
overblown language, employing  a confident yet 
respectful tone, and more.
BF 637 C45 C6649 2010 D1148
Dealing with difficult people.
Roy Lilley.
London, UK; Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2010.
HF 5548.8 L493 2010
Diagnosing and changing  organizational culture: 
based on the competing values framework.
Kim S. Cameron, Robert E. Quinn.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011.
HD 58.8 C32 2011
Difficult conversations: how to discuss what 
matters most.
Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, Sheila Heen.
New York, NY: Penguin Books, c2010.
BF 637 C45 S78 2010
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Doing & saying the right thing.
Edmonton, AB: Sextant, 2009.
HD 61 B66 2009
Doing  business in tough times:  proven strategies 
that work. [videorecording]
Burnaby, BC: Canada Wide Media Limited 
[distributor], c2010. videodisc (DVD) (108 min.): sd., col.; 
4 3/4 in.
Are you worried about the state of the North 
American economy? In this presentation, discover 
how you can weather the economic storm. On this 
DVD, you will learn Peter Legge's 97 tips on how to 
do business in tough times -- these back-to-basics 
tips are essential for business leaders searching  for 
ways to sharpen their  focus and secure the 
profitability and long-term success of their personal 
and professional lives. The key tenets of success 
invariably come back to the simple, basic principles 
encompassed in these 97 tips. Learn them, use them 
and stick to them.
HD 5351 D653 2010 D1105
Engaging the online learner:  activities and 
resources for creative instruction.
Rita-Marie Conrad, J. Ana Donaldson.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2011.
LB 1028.5 C623 2011
The EQ edge: emotional  intelligence and your 
success.
Steven J. Stein, Howard E. Book.
Etobicoke, ON: J. Wiley & Sons Canada, 2011.
BF 576 S733 2011
The ethical  imagination:  journeys of the human 
spirit.
Margaret Somerville.
Toronto, ON: House of Anansi Press, c2006.
BJ 1581.2 S65 2006
Facility emergency management. [videorecording]
Edgartown, MA: Distributed by Emergency Film 
Group, 2010. videodisc (DVD) (28 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 
in. ; + 1 CD-ROM (4 3/4 in.).
This program will help facilities develop an 
emergency plan to be used at incidents of all sizes, 
whether inside or outside of the facility. Topics  
covered include the following: developing  an 
emergency management structure; the role of the 
emergency management team; setting  up the  
Emergency Operations Center (EOC); procedures for 
interfacing  with local and regional response 
personnel; appropriate response to different levels  
of inc idents ; mi t iga t ion and prevent ion; 
preparedness; response; recovery; and the Incident 
Command System (ICS).
HV 551.3 F234 2010 D1061
FireStarter collection. [videorecording]
[Burnsville, MN]: ChartHouse Learning, p2006, 
c1998. videodisc (DVD) (46 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in. + 
facilitator guide (59 p.).
Sometimes we make prisons out of companies and 
corporations, David Whyte says, by the way we 
choose to work in them. Only free people can 
supply the energy, enthusiasm, commitment and 
audacity that organizations need to succeed. But 
how free can we feel if our desire for financial 
rewards or market share becomes so powerful that it 
forces us to submerge our need to be happy, creative 
and imaginative? At what point are we controlled by 
our work, rather than fulfilled or challenged by the 
opportunity to make a difference, to grow and 
discover wonderful new things about ourselves? 
Organizations may create environments that 
encourage a sense of this freedom, but true freedom 
comes from inside human beings who are willing  to 
ask if what we do every day is contributing  to the 
world.
HD 53 F573 2006 (Restricted to in-house.) D1138
GRE graduate record examinations.
New York, NY: Kaplan, c2011.
Offers strategies and techniques to help maximize 
performance, and includes two full-length practice 
tests.
LB 2367.4 G725 2011
The Googlization of everything: (and  why we 
should worry).
Siva Vaidhyanathan.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, c2011.
HD 9696.8 U64 G669 2011
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How remarkable women lead:  the breakthrough 
model for work and life.
Joanna Barsh and Susie Cranston and Geoffrey 
Lewis.
New York, NY: Crown Books, 2009.
BF 637 L4 B36 2009
Illuminating the path.
James J. Thomas and Kristin A. Cook, editors.
Los Alamitos, CA: IEEE Computer Society, 2005.
TK 7882 I6 I45 2005
Insidious workplace behavior.
[edited by] Jerald Greenberg.
New York, NY: Routledge, c2010.
HF 5549.5 E42 I55 2010
Making  the grade: preventing downhill runaways. 
[videorecording]
[New Westminster, B.C.]: Justice Institute of British 
Columbia : PTEC, 1997. videodisc (DVD) (14 min.): sd., 
col.; 4 3/4 in.
Downhill runaways are preventable. This DVD 
reviews the measures that can be taken by 
professional truck drivers to reduce the likelihood of 
becoming  involved in a downhill runaway. Most 
runaways are caused by driving  too fast for the grade 
or travelling  with brakes that are out of adjustment. 
To prevent a downhill runaway, you should conduct 
a daily pre-trip inspection; confirm brakes are 
adjusted; plan the descent; determine a safe descent 
speed; and if necessary, use the runaway lane. This 
DVD takes you through the process and highlights 
key points to remember.
HE 5614.5 C26 M254 1997 D1193
The managed heart:  commercialization of human 
feeling.
Arlie Russell Hochschild.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003.
BF 531 H62 2003
Mind-body workbook for PTSD: a 10-week 
program for healing after trauma.
Stanley H. Block & Carolyn Bryant Block.
Oakland, CA : New Harbinger Publications, c2010.
RC 552 P67 B63 2010
A new kind of monster: the secret life and 
chilling crimes of Colonel Russell Williams.
Timothy Appleby.
Toronto, ON: Random House Canada, 2011.
HV 6248 W54 A66 2011
On becoming a leader.
Warren Bennis.
New York, NY: Basic Books, c2009.
BF 637 L4 B37 2009
Organizational stress management:  a strategic 
approach.
Ashley Weinberg, Valerie J. Sutherland, and Cary 
Cooper.
Basingstoke, Hampshire [England]; New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.
HF 5548.85 W38 2010
The perfect online course: best practices for 
designing and teaching.
edited by Anymir Orellana, Terry L. Hudgins, and 
Michael Simonson.
Charlotte, NC: IAP, Information Age Pub., c2009.
LB 1028.38 P47 2009
Physics of bullying: a new approach to bullying 
intervention using  the laws of conservation and 
symmetry. [videorecording]
[Kaslo, BC]: Heartspeak Productions, c2009. 
videodisc (DVD) (40 min.): sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
Thousands of children avoid school each day for fear 
of being  persecuted by their peers; countless more 
dread it for the same reason. This timely, insightful, 
and truly practical DVD shows parents, teachers, 
administrators, and community leaders how to begin 
creating healthier, safer communities.
BF 637 B85 P493 2009 D1151
Presentation is everything. [videorecording]
Miss issauga, ON: RG Training  Resources 
[distributor], p2010, c2007. videodisc (DVD) (17 min.): 
sd., col.; 4 3/4 in.
Help individuals structure and deliver effective 
presentations: and avoid death by PowerPoint. 
We've all sat through presentations that have left us 
shell-shocked, bored or baffled. A poorly delivered 
presentation can leave us feeling  confused, and the 
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presenter feeling  dejected. A well thought through 
presentation can fill the presenter with confidence 
that they've got the message across in an interesting 
and engaging  way. Alan (Matthew Horne) is an old 
hand at presentations. He's given more than he cares 
to mention: and more than his audiences care to 
remember! Cue Christine (Sally Philips) to help him 
reflect on his less glorious efforts and help him think 
through his preparation, structure and style to ensure 
that everyone leaves his presentations understanding 
what he was trying to tell them.
HF 5718.22 P744 2010 D1125
The power of pull: how small moves, smartly 
made, can set big things in motion.
John Hagel III, John Seely Brown, Lang Davison.
New York, NY: Basic Books, c2010.
Explains the principles of "pull" and how to 
effectively apply it to individuals and organizations 
to increase organizational and social change and 
develop creative talent.
HD 58.7 H334 2010
Reena Virk: critical perspectives on a Canadian 
murder.
edited by Mythili Rajiva and Sheila Batacharya.
Toronto, ON: CSPI, 2010.
HV 6535 C33 V53 2010
Research and  evaluation in  education and 
psychology :  in tegra t ing  d ivers i ty wi th 
quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods.
Donna M. Mertens.
Los Angeles, CA: Sage, c2010.
LB 1028 M3964 2010
Research methodology: a step-by-step guide for 
beginners.
Ranjit Kumar.
Los Angeles, CA; London, UK: SAGE, 2011.
H 62 K84 2011
The subtlety of emotions.
Aaron Ben-Zeev.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, c2000.
BF 531 B43 2000
The survivor personality:  why some people are 
stronger, smarter, and more skillful at handling 
life's difficulties - and how you can be, too.
Al Siebert ; contributing  editors: Kristin Pintarich and 
Molly Siebert.
New York, NY: Perigree, 2010.
BF 637 L53 S54 2010
Toxic talk: what would you say? [videorecording]
Bensenville, IL: Learning  Communications; 
Miss issauga, ON: RG Training  Resources 
[distributor], c2009. videodisc (12 min., 22 sec.): sd., col.; 
4 3/4 in. + CD-ROM (4 3/4 in.)
Gossip, gripes, and rumors have become a national 
past time in the workplace. Unfortunately, these 
forms of toxic talk can have serious repercussions for 
your employees, your managers and supervisors, 
and for the profitability and productivity of your 
entire organization. Relationships and camaraderie 
at work are essential for an engaged workforce. 
However, the examples depicted in this training 
toolkit have crossed the line and have become 
damaging  to employee relationships, employee 
morale and productivity. Whether your organization 
already has a policy on toxic talk or you're just 
beginning  to look at the effects damaging 
communication has on your productivity, this 
program is designed to give your organization a 
chance to discuss some real issues affecting  your 
workforce. Using  three open-ended scenarios (two 
videos and one audio), the training  design focuses 
on how to respond if you become engaged in toxic 
conversation and helps participants to redirect  
potentially hazardous communication. The activities 
also help participants understand the different 
perceptions of those involved in toxic talk and how 
others are affected by this behaviour.
HF 5718 T698 2009 D1192
What's holding  you back?:  ten bold steps that 
define gutsy leaders.
Robert J. Herbold.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2011.
HD 30.23 H48 2011
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TWO SUPREME COURT JUDGES 
TO RETIRE
 
O n M ay 1 3 , 2 0 1 1 Th e R i g h t 
Honourable Beverley McLachlin, Chief 
Justice of Canada, announced that 
Justice Ian Binnie and Justice Louise 
Charron have written to the Minister of 
Justice, the Honourable Robert Nicholson, to inform 
him that they will retire from the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Justice Charron’s retirement will be effective 
August 30, 2011. Justice Binnie’s retirement will take 
effect upon the same date or, if there is a delay in the 
nomination process, so soon thereafter as his 
replacement is appointed.  The Judges Act provides 
that a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada may, 
for a period of six months following  his or her 
retirement, continue to participate in judgments with 
respect to cases heard prior to retiring.
“The departure of Justices Binnie and Charron will 
leave an important void on the Court.  Both have 
served the Court with great wisdom and dedication 
and have made significant and lasting  contributions 
to the administration of justice in Canada. They are 
valued colleagues and friends. We will miss them,” 
said Chief Justice McLachlin.
For his part, Justice Binnie said, “It has been an 
honour and a privilege to serve on the Supreme 
Court of Canada since January 1998. Much as I will 
miss the work and my colleagues, I am now well 
into my fourteenth year on the Court and the time 
has come to return to Toronto to pick up some of the 
threads of an earlier existence.  I deeply appreciate 
the opportunities given to me to participate in the 
administration of justice in so many different 
capacities over more than 44 years and I thank those 
who from time to time made it possible”. 
Justice Charron said, “I feel truly privileged to have 
spent the last years of my judicial career serving  the 
Canadian people as a member of the Supreme Court 
of Canada.  As promised when I took the oath of 
office, I have brought to this task my best, every day, 
whatever that could be at the time. I hope that I have 
lived up to the trust and honour that was bestowed 
upon me. The reasons for my decision to retire are 
quite simple. I have recently turned 60. My husband 
and I both enjoy good health. We have a great 
family and wonderful friends. I have been a judge 
for 23 years now and the seventh anniversary of my 
appointment to the Court, August 30 next, seems 
like the perfect time to move on”.
Justice Binnie was appointed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada on January 8, 1998, after a distinguished 
career as an advocate in courts and tribunals across 
Canada and before the International Court of Justice 
at The Hague.  Justice Charron was appointed to the 
Supreme Court of Canada on August 30, 2004, after 
having  served on the Ontario Court of Appeal, the 
Ontario Court of Justice (General Division) and the 
District Court of Ontario.
Chief Justice McLachlin concluded saying  “I am 
certain that the Canadian government will give 
priority consideration to the appointment of two 
new justices of the Supreme Court with all the care 
and del iberat ion that i s required in the 
circumstances.”
CERTAINTY NOT REQUIRED FOR 
REASONABLE GROUNDS:
ODOUR SUFFICES
R. v. Ashby, 2011 BCSC 513
At about 3:20 pm a police officer 
saw a vehicle travelling  94 km/h in 
an 80 km/h zone and driving  outside 
the tracks that had been made in the 
snow by other vehicles. The driver’s 
window was down about one-quarter the way and 
the sun roof was open part-way, even though it was 
-21 Celsius. The accused was pulled over and asked 
for her driver’s licence and registration. The vehicle 
was a rental vehicle and the officer noted a strong 
odour of vegetative green marihuana, similar to the 
smell of marihuana in a grow operation. He noted a 
red bag  on the passenger’s seat, fast food wrappers 
on the floor, and an odour of men’s cologne in the 
vehicle. A computer search revealed that the 
accused had a conviction for possessing  marihuana 
about 12 years earlier. When the officer returned to 
the vehicle he again noted a strong  odour of 
vegetative marihuana and arrested the accused for 
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possessing  marihuana. He 
also advised her of the right 
to counsel. Approximately 21 
kgs. of marihuana was found 
in the trunk of the vehicle and 
about $17,000 was found in 
the travel bag  on the front 
passenger seat. The accused 
was subsequently charged 
with possession for the 
purpose of trafficking.
 
At trial in British Columbia Supreme Court the 
officer testified that he had reasonable grounds to 
arrest the accused:
 
• She was driving  a rental vehicle and drug 
couriers often use someone else’s car to avoid 
detection and seizure of their own car. It also 
allows a driver to deny knowledge of the drugs 
that may be found in the vehicle;
• The smell of male cologne was important 
because in his experience it is often used to 
mask the smell of marihuana in a vehicle;
• The fast food wrappers on the floor were 
important because in his experience people 
couriering  marihuana do not wish to stop for 
very long, or to leave their car in order to eat 
and, therefore, may pick up food from drive-
through or fast food restaurants and leave the 
wrappers in the vehicle;
• The window and sun roof were open. It was -21 
Celsius and he believed the accused may be 
trying  to vent the smell of the marihuana from 
the vehicle;
• There was a strong  smell of vegetative 
marihuana;
• The officer had experience in dealing  with 
marihuana in the past. He had been involved in 
the dismantling  of approximately 10 indoor 
grow operations and five outdoor grow 
operations. He had made several stops of 
vehicles in which he had smelled burned 
marihuana or marihuana bud. When he 
searched these vehicles he had found 
marihuana in the vehicles. The officer was also 
able to distinguish between the smell of burned 
marihuana, marihuana buds, and 
marihuana plants.
 
The accused challenged the 
legality of the arrest by attacking 
the officer’s reasonable grounds. 
If the arrest was unlawful then the 
search incidental to that arrest 
would be unreasonable and a 
breach of s. 8 of the Charter. She 
argued many things, including:
 
• The officer did not have reasonable grounds to 
believe that she had committed an indictable 
offence;
• The officer did not find her committing  a 
criminal offence;
• The officer, at most, might have had a suspicion. 
There were other reasonable alternate 
explanations for the rental vehicle, smell of 
cologne, fast food wrappers and the window 
being  open. Even the strong  smell of vegetative 
marihuana with the other factors did not meet 
the requirement of reasonable grounds to 
believe that the accused was in possession of 
marihuana;
• The officer was not in a position to know 
whether the quantity exceeded 30 grams and 
could not know whether it was strictly a 
summary offence or an indictable offence; and
• The officer should have believed on reasonable 
grounds that the public interest could be 
satisfied without arrest and that he had no 
reasonable grounds to believe that if he did not 
arrest the accused she would fail to attend court 
in order to be dealt with according  to law, thus 
rendering the arrest unlawful under s. 495(2).
 
Following  a thorough canvassing  of the case law on 
odour cases, British Columbia Supreme Court Justice 
Powers concluded the arrest was lawful:
 
In the circumstances of this case, did the officer 
have reasonable grounds to believe that [the 
accused] had committed an indictable offence 
or was committing  an offence? A number of the 
indicators are neutral and by themselves may 
simply raise a suspicion. However, the strong 
odour of vegetative marihuana gives added 
“The strong odour of vegetative 
marihuana in this case, however, 
was sufficient on its own to 
support a reasonable belief that 
[the accused] was in possession 
of marihuana, or had committed 
the indictable offence of being in 
possession of marihuana.”  
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significance to those factors as well. The strong 
odour of vegetative marihuana in this case, 
however, was sufficient on its own to support a 
reasonable belief that [the accused] was in 
possession of marihuana, or had committed the 
indictable offence of being  in possession of 
marihuana. It is not necessary that all other 
explanations be eliminated.
 
It is true that the officer could not “know” or be 
sure or certain that an offence had been 
committed or was being committed. However, it 
is not necessary that he be certain. The officer 
must subjectively believe and have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the offence had been 
committed or be able to, based on his own 
observation, reach a reasonable conclusion that 
an offence was being committed. The officer 
may not “know” or be sure until his search 
revealed the evidence, but in this case the strong 
smell of vegetative marihuana was, in my 
opinion, a strong indicator based 
on his own observations which led 
the officer to believe that he found 
[the accused] committing  an 
offence. He did agree in cross-
examination that he could not be 
sure or certain of his conclusions. 
He did acknowledge to [the 
accused] that if he was wrong and 
he did not find the marihuana that 
he believed was there, that he 
would release her.
………
[The accused] also argues that 
when she was removed from her 
own vehicle it should have become 
apparent that the odour was really 
emanating from her, rather than the 
vehicle. She argues that when the 
officer did a quick search of her 
and did not find any marihuana, he 
should have re-assessed his findings and, if he 
had done so, would have concluded that he no 
longer had grounds to arrest her or to search her 
vehicle. [The accused] argues that he should 
have then released her and not continued with 
his search. I disagree. The officer had made an 
arrest on reasonable grounds and on the belief 
that [the accused] was in possession of 
marihuana. Simply because he did not find the 
marihuana immediately upon her person would 
simply indicate that it was somewhere else, and 
that is in her vehicle. In determining  whether the 
officer’s actions were reasonable I need to 
consider the circumstances in which they 
occurred, including  the fact that he had just 
arrested her on the side of the road and had just 
began his search. It would be unreasonable to 
subject his actions to a moment-by-moment 
review, or to require the officer to do so. 
[emphasis added, paras. 94-97]
 
And further:
 
The police have the power to arrest somebody if 
they have reasonable grounds to believe that the 
person has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence (s. 495(1)(a) of the Code). 
They may also arrest somebody if they find 
someone committing  a criminal offence (s. 
495(1)(b), subject to s. 495(2) and (3)). In this 
case, the reasonable grounds consisted of the 
constellation of factors I have 
referred to earlier, particularly 
in light of the “strong  smell of 
vegetative marihuana”. The 
police officer could not know 
or be sure that [the accused] 
w a s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f 
marihuana, but certainly had 
reasonable grounds to believe 
she was. This was not the kind 
of case where the officer 
suspected he would only find 
minimal amounts making it a 
purely summary offence. The 
power to arrest under s. 495(1)
(a) that relates to indictable 
of fences includes hybrid 
o f f ence s wh ich may be 
prosecuted by indictment or 
summarily.
 
If the quantum of marihuana was less than 30 
grams it would be a summary offence (Section 
4(4) and (5) and Schedule VIII(2) of the CDSA). 
Even if it were successfully argued that because 
the police officer could not be sure that the 
quantum was over 30 grams, he had reasonable 
grounds to believe that he was dealing with a 
summary offence. I am satisfied that he found 
[the accused] “committing  a criminal offence” 
based on his own observations; that is, the 
“It is true that the officer 
could not “know” or be sure 
or certain that an offence 
had been committed or was 
being committed. However, it 
is not necessary that he be 
certain. The officer must 
subjectively believe and have 
reasonable grounds to 
believe that the offence had 
been committed or be able 
to, based on his own 
observation, reach a 
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strong smell of vegetative marihuana. It is true 
that there were alternate explanations for the 
strong smell, such as [the accused] having been 
in the midst of a grow operation prior to being 
stopped by the police. However, the conclusion 
that she was at the time committing an offence, 
need not be the only conclusion that the 
observations of the officer supports, but it must 
be a rational one. In this case I find it was a 
rational conclusion.
 
Even if the officer could only say that he had 
found her committing a summary convictions 
offence, the arrest was appropriate pursuant to s. 
495(2) and (3), the need to secure or preserve 
evidence or to prevent the continuation of the 
offence. [paras. 113-115]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
PROTECTIVE SEARCH BECAME 
AN INVESTIGATIVE ONE:
s. 8 CHARTER BREACHED
R. v. Phengchanh, 2011 BCSC 484
A police officer saw that the side 
mirror of a vehicle was damaged 
(contrary to s.  7.04 of the Motor 
Vehicle Act Regulations) and decided 
to pull it over and give the driver a 
notice and order requesting  it be repaired within a 
few days.  The officer broadcast the location of the 
stop and the licence plate was queried on CPIC. The 
vehicle was insured and not stolen. However, PRIME 
disclosed that the vehicle was involved in a 
“kidnapping  and forcible confinement” in 2005 or 
2006, and had been the subject of a street check 
during  the same time. A sergeant covered on the call 
and when the vehicle was pulled over the accused 
was the lone occupant.  He was advised of the 
reason for the stop and produced his licence and 
registration as requested. He was very, very nervous 
and did not make eye contact with the officer. A 
further PRIME check revealed the accused was 
involved with drugs and an Asian Gang. He was 
asked to get out of his vehicle because the officer 
wanted to conduct a pat down search before giving 
the notice and order. He complied, was patted down 
by the sergeant, but no weapons were found. A 
search of the driver’s seat area was then conducted 
but no weapons were found here either. However, a 
box-like area below the driver’s seat was located. 
This was something  the officer had never seen 
before in any car. The back door of the car was 
opened to examine this box-like area and a flap of 
heroin was discovered in the foot well of the back 
seat where a passenger would usually sit. The 
accused was arrested for possessing  heroin and a 
police dog  did a thorough search of the vehicle. Two 
more flaps of a narcotic and a holster, which held an 
unloaded .38 calibre Beretta pistol and two 
magazines, were found in the airbag  area. The 
accused was charged with weapons and drug 
offences.
 
The Stop - Lawful
        
The judge found the stop was a lawful exercise of 
police authority. It resulted from the officer 
observing  a potential violation of s.  7.04 of the 
Motor Vehicle Act Regulations. It was not a ruse for 
some other investigation. Thus, it was not arbitrary 
and did not breach s. 9 of the Charter.
 
The Pat-Down - Lawful
 
The judge also found the pat down search to be 
lawful. “I am also satisfied that, from an assessment 
of all of the known facts and circumstances of the 
situation, including  reasonable inferences that might 
be drawn from the information [the officer] obtained 
from the PRIME database, [she] had reasonable 
grounds, both subjectively and objectively, to 
conduct the accused’s ‘pat down’ protective safety 
search.”
 
The Vehicle Search - Unlawful
 
The judge found the vehicle search for safety was 
not reasonable. He held that the officer’s subjective 
belief in the need for a search of the vehicle for 
officer safety was not objectively reasonable. “In my 
view, the protective search for officer safety became 
an investigative search to locate evidence when [the 
officer] began the search of the driver’s side of the 
accused’s vehicle,” said the judge. “At that time, the 
accused was already outside of his vehicle and had 
already been subjected to a ‘pat down’ search by 
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[the sergeant]. Therefore, the search of the accused’s 
vehicle lost its lawful character as incidental to 
detention.” Thus the search breached s. 8.
 
Admissibility
 
The evidence was excluded. The officer was not 
acting  in good faith. “Good faith cannot be claimed 
if a Charter violation is committed on the basis of a 
police officer’s unreasonable error or ignorance as to 
the scope of his or her authority.” The search was 
intrusive and “the public also expects those engaged 
in law enforcement to respect the rights and 
freedoms we all enjoy by acting  within the limits of 
their lawful authority.”
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
CONCURRENT CRIMINAL LAW 
PURPOSE DOES NOT 
NECESSARILY INVALIDATE 
REGULATORY SEARCH
R. v. Sandhu, 2011 ONCA 124
A citizen spotted the accused’s 
tractor trailer parked beside a 
passenger vehicle in a private area of 
a transport terminal lot. He noticed 
i tems being  loaded f rom the 
passenger vehicle into the back of the trailer. As the 
citizen drove nearby, the tractor-trailer and the 
passenger vehicle drove away, leaving  the lot and 
travelling  in opposite directions. The citizen 
followed the tractor trailer and was able to force it to 
stop. Coincidentally, a Ministry of Transportation 
officer saw what was happening  and drove up 
behind the tractor-trailer, activated his flashing  lights, 
and decided to inspect the transport truck. The 
police were called to assist. During  a conversation 
with police the accused made reference to a firearm, 
stating  that someone “had put a gun to his head and 
told him that he had to put things into the back of 
his tractor-trailer truck.” Then, purportedly acting 
under the inspection provisions found in Ontario’s 
Highway Traffic Act [HTA], the rear doors of the 
trailer were opened. No consent was obtained nor 
was consideration given to getting  a warrant. In the 
trailer were shrink-wrapped pallets of baby carrots 
and nine bales wrapped in dark plastic. Police 
opened one of the bales with a knife to examine its 
contents, found drugs, and arrested the accused. A 
search warrant was subsequently obtained and 
executed. As a result 205 kgs. of cocaine were 
seized and the accused was charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.  
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
Crown argued that the initial inspection of the trailer 
was authorized under s. 216.1 of the HTA, which 
permits an officer to examine, at any time, a 
commercial vehicle, its contents and all documents 
relating  to the ownership and operation of the 
vehicle to determine whether legislation relevant to 
commercial vehicles is being  complied with. 
However, the Crown conceded that cutting  into the 
bale breached s. 8  of the Charter since it was done 
without a warrant. But the trial judge ruled that the 
initial search was not authorized under s. 216.1 and, 
since the evidence was obtained from a Charter 
violation, the evidence was presumptively 
inadmissible. The Crown had failed to discharge its 
onus of demonstrating  that the cocaine was 
admissible under s. 24(2). The judge held that the 
Ministry officer never had a simple HTA inspection 
in mind and, even if he did, his intention was 
superseded by criminal law concerns once the 
accused spoke about a gun. Further, he found it 
incredible that the officers could have believed their 
actions were in furtherance of an enforcement 
inspection rather than a criminal investigation. The 
Charter-infringing  conduct was at the more serious 
end of the spectrum, and the warrantless search was 
intrusive, invasive, and done knowing  a warrant was 
required. Although the evidence was real and 
reliable, the charge serious, and exclusion would 
end the prosecution, the judge nonetheless excluded 
it. “I conclude ... that it ought to be evident to any 
fair and right thinking  person who seeks to uphold 
the core values of our judicial system, that the 
admission of the illegally obtained evidence in this 
case extracts a small, albeit meaningful, toll on the 
truth seeking  goal of the criminal trial, as compared 
to the damage that would be caused to the long-
term respect and belief of Canadians in the rule of 
law and their confidence that it binds both citizen 
and state in equal measure, as would be the case if 
that evidence were to be admitted in the face of 
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such arrogant and abhorrent state conduct,” he said. 
The accused was acquitted.
The Crown appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing  that the trial judge erred in holding  that 
evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search 
was presumptively inadmissible under s. 24(2) and 
in placing  an onus on the Crown to rebut this 
presumption. Further, the Crown suggested that the 
trial judge did not properly assess the evidence 
relating  to the nature and extent of the s. 8  Charter 
breach and failed to engage in any meaningful 
balancing of the three s. 24(2) factors.
Onus Under s. 24(2)            
In this case, the trial judge held that evidence 
obtained by an unauthorized search was 
presumptively inadmissible and that the Crown had 
the burden of demonstrating  that the admission of 
such evidence would not bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute. This was an error and the trial 
judge approached the s. 24(2) issue from the wrong 
perspective. Instead, it is the person applying  for 
exclusion of evidence under s. 
24(2) who must satisfy the 
c o u r t o n a b a l a n c e o f 
probabilities that the admission 
of the evidence could bring  the 
administration of justice into 
disrepute. There is, however, a 
“common sense proposition 
that in cases involving  an 
unreasonable search, unless 
the Crown can show the police 
had a reasonable basis for 
acting  as they did, as a 
practical matter, a presumption 
may arise that the Charter-
infringing  state conduct was serious.” But this does 
not transform the onus of proof under s. 24(2) so as 
to require the Crown to demonstrate that admission 
of evidence obtained under the search would not 
bring  the administration of justice into disrepute. 
“Even if one presumes in certain circumstances that 
Charter-infringing  state conduct is serious, that does 
not determine the s. 24(2) analysis,” said Justice 
Simmons. “Rather, it remains necessary to consider 
the other lines of inquiry in the [s. 24(2) Charter] 
analytical framework, and ‘to balance the 
assessments under each of these lines of inquiry to 
de t e rm ine whe the r, con s ide r i ng  a l l t he 
circumstances, admission of the evidence would 
bring the administration of justice into disrepute’.”
Concurrent Purposes
The Court of Appeal found that the existence of a 
concurrent criminal law purpose did not in itself 
make a search that was otherwise authorized by law 
unreasonable under the Charter. Although a 
warrantless search shifts the onus to the Crown to 
establish on a balance of probabilities that the 
search was authorized by law, that the law was 
reasonable, and that the manner in which the search 
was carried out was reasonable, a change in focus of 
the investigation (eg. from a mere regulatory one to 
one involving  criminal infractions) does not 
necessarily render the search unreasonable. “[T]he 
existence of a concurrent criminal law search 
purpose does not, in itself, preclude the existence of 
a valid regulatory search purpose – nor does it, in 
itself, make a search that is otherwise authorized by 
law unreasonable under the 
Charter,” said Justice Simmons. 
“[W]hen considered as a whole, 
the trial judge’s reasons reflect an 
either/or approach to assessing  the 
evidence concerning  the officers’ 
motivations when the trailer doors 
were opened and fail to reflect an 
appreciation that the presence of 
the criminal law search purpose 
does not, of itself, preclude the 
presence of a valid regulatory 
search purpose.” In this case, the 
enforcement officer did not require 
an articulable basis for invoking  his 
authority under s. 216.1. He was entitled to conduct 
an inspection to confirm regulatory compliance 
even in the absence of reasonable and probable 
grounds for believing  that some infraction had been 
committed. The trial judge was required to 
determine whether the officer initially formed a 
legitimate intention to search the tractor-trailer for 
regulatory purposes (whether he possessed a 
concurrent criminal law purpose or not) and, if he 
did, whether that legitimate intention was still 
“[T]he existence of a 
concurrent criminal law search 
purpose does not, in itself, 
preclude the existence of a 
valid regulatory search purpose 
– nor does it, in itself, make a 
search that is otherwise 
authorized by law unreasonable 
under the Charter.”  
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subsisting  when he opened the trailer doors. It was 
not enough for the trial judge to simply determine 
whether the officer had a criminal law purpose - 
even a predominant criminal law purpose - as events 
progressed. Thus, the trial judge erred when 
assessing  the officers’ evidence relating  to whether 
opening  the trailer doors amounted to a s. 8 Charter 
breach. He failed to advert to the principles that the 
presence of a criminal law purpose does not, in 
itself, preclude the existence of a valid regulatory 
search purpose or make a search that is otherwise 
authorized by law unreasonable under the Charter.
Balancing s. 24(2) Factors
Even if the Charter-infringing  state conduct fell at the 
most serious end of the spectrum, it was still 
necessary to balance that assessment against the 
assessments arising  from the impact of the 
misconduct on the accused’s Charter-protected 
rights and the fact that exclusion of the evidence 
would put an end to the prosecution of a very 
serious charge. “To the extent that the [accused] had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trailer, his 
Charter-protected interest could only be described as 
minimal,” said the Court. Commercial trucking  is a 
highly regulated industry and truckers can expect to 
be subject to random inspections from time to time. 
Further, the accused had an extremely low level of 
privacy interest in the trailer. He did not own it, had 
no authority to determine what was loaded into it, 
and was not allowed to place anything  in it without 
the owner's permission. He generally did not load 
goods into the trailer himself and the suppliers often 
secured the back of it. He did not have permission 
from the owner to put any items into the trailer other 
than the load he was supposed to deliver and there 
was no lock on the trailer doors. Here, the trial judge 
failed to engage in any meaningful balancing  of the 
three s. 24(2) factors. 
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his acquittal was 
set aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
UNDERCOVER CELL-PLANT DID 
NOT BREACH s. 9
R. v. Chung, 2011 BCCA 131
The accused was arrested in Ontario 
on the authority of an arrest warrant 
issued out of Vancouver, British 
Columbia. He was advised of his 
right to instruct counsel but said 
“No” when asked if he wanted to call a lawyer. He 
was booked into cells and the Vancouver Police 
were advised of the arrest.  Crown counsel in 
Vancouver later authorized the accused’s return to 
Vancouver. While at the police station that night the 
accused twice more declined to call a lawyer. The 
next day he was taken before a Justice of the Peace 
(JP) in Ontario. He had been in custody for about 33 
hours, a circumstance that breached s.  503(1)(a) of 
the Criminal Code which requires an appearance 
before a JP  within 24 hours of arrest. There was no 
explanation for this delay, nor was there evidence 
that the delay was deliberate or designed to facilitate 
police investigation. Instead, the delay appeared to 
have been caused by administrative error. 
The accused was remanded in custody for six days 
and the warrant of remand directed that he be 
conveyed to a named provincial corrections center 
or “other Provincial Correctional Facility”. He was 
taken to a remand centre (a provincial facility) 
pending  his transportation to Vancouver.  At the 
request of Vancouver detectives, the York Regional 
Police were to conduct a cell-plant operation.  Two 
British Columbia deputy sheriffs flew to Toronto to 
execute the accused’s arrest warrant.  A deputy 
sheriff advised the accused of his right to counsel 
and this time he said he wanted to call a lawyer. 
After the deputy sheriffs appeared before a JP for an 
endorsement of the warrant under s. 528  of the 
Criminal Code, thereby formally executing  it, he was 
moved from the detention centre located near the 
airport to a police detachment some 45 kms. away 
so he could be lodged in a police cell in order to 
facilitate the undercover operation. At the 
detachment the accused told police he wanted to 
speak to duty counsel. After an attempt to get 
through to a Vancouver duty counsel lawyer was www.10-8.ca
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unsuccessful, the accused requested a Vancouver 
lawyer of choice. Efforts to reach this lawyer were 
unsuccessful. The lawyer was not in his office and 
police were told he did not practice criminal law. A 
second effort to get in contact with a Vancouver 
legal aid lawyer was unsuccessful. Contact was 
subsequently made with an Ontario duty counsel, 
who the accused spoke with for 14 minutes. The 
accused did not express any dissatisfaction with this 
call. He was placed in a cell next to an undercover 
officer posing  as a fellow prisoner and made self-
incriminating  statements about the British Columbia 
offences. 
Although the British Columbia Supreme Court trial 
judge found the accused was not taken before a JP 
in compliance with s.  503 Criminal Code (the 24-
hour time limit) and was therefore in custody longer 
than the maximum time permitted, the extra delay of 
eight hours, given the timing  of the arrest in the 
morning  hours, was not significant. “While it 
technically may be a breach of s. 9 rights, it is not 
serious enough to justify exclusion of subsequently-
obtained evidence,” he said. The accused also 
claimed that moving  him 45 kms. further away from 
the airport and not detaining  him in a provincial 
institution as required by the remand order also 
rendered his detention arbitrary. The trial judge, 
however, rejected this. He found that no s. 9 breach 
arose out of the place of detention after the arrest 
warrant had been executed by the deputy sheriffs. In 
his view, the investigative power of the police did 
not end until the accused had been returned to 
Vancouver for further remand. The judge also ruled 
that the accused’s s. 10(b) rights were not violated. 
The accused spoke to Ontario duty counsel and 
made no complaints he was unable to speak to the 
lawyer of his choice. The undercover evidence was 
admissible, the accused was convicted, and he was 
sentenced to 12 years in prison. 
s. 9 Charter: s. 503 CC Time Limit
The Court of Appeal agreed that the accused’s s. 9 
rights had been breached. But rather than 
characterizing  the breach as merely technical as 
done by the trial judge, Justice Low, speaking  for the 
unanimous Court of Appeal, instead said it was not 
serious or significant since it was of short duration 
and the product of administrative error. The breach 
had no connection with obtaining  the incriminating 
statements and did not vitiate the Vancouver arrest 
warrant.  The arrest warrant was properly executed 
by the deputy sheriffs after the accused’s appearance 
before a JP  and there was no suggestion that the JP 
was without jurisdiction to remand the accused or 
later authorize the execution of the warrant.
s. 9 Charter: Moving the Accused
Although some cases have made a distinction 
between investigative police custody and the court’s 
jurisdiction over an accused, the Court of Appeal 
refused to hold that an appearance before a judicial 
officer always cloaks the accused in some sort of 
protection from proper police investigative enquiry, 
such as a properly conducted undercover 
operation. Justice Low stated:
[H]ere there was, in my opinion, no breach of 
the s. 9 rights of the [accused] by reason of the 
fact that when the undercover operation was 
conducted the [accused] was in a police lockup 
and not in a provincial jail as directed by the 
remand warrant. This is because once the deputy 
sheriffs executed the Vancouver arrest warrant, 
the remand warrant no longer applied.  Its 
purpose was to hold the [accused] in custody 
pending execution of the arrest warrant.  The 
remand had run its course. Thereafter, the deputy 
sheriffs were entitled to arrange with the York 
police for a place in which to hold the [accused] 
in custody until it was time to go to the airport.  
It matters not what police lockup was used. Nor 
does it matter that the deputy sheriffs might not 
have known about the undercover operation.  
Their mandate was to transport, not to 
investigate.  At the critical time, the [accused] 
was in lawful custody at a suitable place and his 
custody was not arbitrary. [para. 30]
Criminal Code s. 503 (1)(a) A peace officer who arrests a 
person with or without warrant ... shall cause the 
person to be detained in custody and, in accordance 
with the following provisions, to be taken before a 
justice to be dealt with according to law: (a) where a 
justice is available within a period of twenty-four hours 
after the person has been arrested by or delivered to 
the peace officer, the person shall be taken before a 
justice without unreasonable delay and in any event 
within that period, ... 
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s. 10(b) Charter: Right to counsel
The accused had submitted that his s. 10(b) right to 
counsel had been breached because the police 
officer who assisted him in obtaining  access to 
counsel of his choice failed to make reasonable 
efforts. In his view, the police officer made a 
“feeble” attempt to put him in touch with his 
lawyer.  But the Court of Appeal found no such 
breach:
Mr. McGregor [the accused’s lawyer] was not the 
accused’s first choice. He initially asked to speak 
to duty counsel.  When told that Mr.  McGregor 
was not available and did not practise criminal 
law, the [accused] did not persist. He did not ask 
that Mr.  McGregor be called later or say he 
would speak only to Mr.  McGregor.  After the 
[accused] had spoken to local duty counsel for a 
reasonable period of time, he expressed no 
concern about the opportunity he had been 
given to consult counsel. [para. 44]
And further:
The [accused] received legal advice. There is no 
evidence that the advice given was not 
competent.   The police officers acted reasonably 
in attempting to put the [accused] in touch with 
duty counsel in Vancouver and, later, with 
Mr.  McGregor. The [accused] did speak to 
counsel for a reasonable period of time and 
expressed no dissatisfaction. There was no 
reason for the police officers to believe that the 
[accused’s] rights under s.  10(b) had not been 
fully exercised. Nor was there any reason for the 
trial judge to conclude otherwise. [para. 49]
The Evidence
Since there was no connection between the minor s. 
9 breach resulting  from noncompliance with the 24-
hour time limit and the undercover officer obtaining 
the incriminating  evidence, the accused’s statements 
were not subject to exclusion.  If the accused had 
been taken before a JP within 24 hours, he would 
have been remanded for six days and all subsequent 
events would have unfolded as they did.  The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available a www.courts.gov.bc.ca
FRESHLY BURNT MARIHUANA 
ODOUR & CASH PROVIDES 
BASIS FOR ARREST
R. v. Loewen, 2011 SCC
After stopping  the accused for 
speeding, an officer noticed an 
odour of freshly burnt marijuana 
coming  from the vehicle and saw a 
duffle bag  on the back seat. The 
accused identified himself verbally by name but 
could not produce a driver’s licence. The officer 
invited him to move into the police vehicle to check 
his identity. Before getting  in, the officer patted the 
accused down for officer safety reasons, discovering 
$5,410 in cash. The accused then admitted that he 
misidentified himself and a new name was provided. 
After issuing  a speeding  ticket under the second 
name, the officer arrested the accused for possessing 
a controlled substance and indicated he was going 
to search the vehicle. The officer found 100 grams of 
cocaine in the vehicle and the accused then 
provided his real name.
 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
Crown submitted that the large bundle of cash found 
on the accused implied trafficking, which suggested 
quantities over 30 grams, justifying  an arrest under s. 
495(1)(a) (on reasonable grounds), as opposed to an 
arrest under under s. 495(1)(b) of the Criminal Code 
(finds committing). The accused, on the other hand, 
contended that the officer did not see any marijuana 
and therefore did not “find” him committing  an 
offence as required by s. 495(1)(b). In his view, the 
smell could not amount to “finding” an offence 
being  committed because the smell of burnt 
marijuana did not give sufficient grounds for arrest, 
since burnt marijuana was at best indicative of past 
possession, not present possession. 
The trial judge agreed with the Crown and found 
that the accused’s arrest was lawfully made under s. 
495(1)(a), which allows an officer to arrest an 
individual whom they believe on reasonable 
grounds has committed an indictable offence. “What 
the cash adds to the smell is an indication of buying 
or selling  of drugs in a relatively large quantity,” said 
the judge. Although possession of marihuana in 
excess of 30 grams is required to constitute an 
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indictable offence, the trial judge held that the 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
accused was in possession of sufficient marijuana to 
constitute an indictable offence, having  regard to the 
totality of the evidence, including  the smell of burnt 
marijuana in the car and the sum of $5,410 found in 
his pocket, mostly in $20 bills, which suggested 
involvement in the drug  trade. “Based on . . . the 
smell, the precise nature of it and where it came 
from, how that smell was associated with the 
accused and the accused alone, and the cash on the 
accused’s person, the officer came to the conclusion 
that the accused was currently in possession of 
marijuana, arrested him for this, and searched for 
evidence in a search incident to that arrest,” said the 
judge. There were no Charter breaches and, even if 
there were, the evidence would have been admitted 
under s. 24(2). The admission of the real evidence 
would not have rendered the trial unfair, the Charter 
breach was not serious, the officer acted in good 
faith, and the accused had a reduced privacy interest 
in the vehicle.  The accused was convicted of 
possessing  a controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking.
 
The accused then challenged his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing  the evidence against 
him was obtained from an illegal search that 
followed an unlawful arrest. But a majority of the 
Court of Appeal disagreed. Both Justices Slatter and 
Hunt agreed that the trial judge made no error and 
upheld the arrest under s. 495(1)(a). Since the arrest 
was lawful the search that followed was proper as an 
incident to arrest and there were no Charter 
breaches. Further, even if there were violations of 
the Charter the evidence of the cocaine was 
admissible under s. 24(2).  Justice Berger, however, 
disagreed. In his view the arrest was unlawful, the 
search was unrelated to the arrest, and the evidence 
was inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter. The 
accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada.
Arrest: s. 495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code
The unanimous Supreme Court (7:0) first noted that 
if the accused’s arrest was unlawful, his detention 
violated s. 9 of the Charter  and the search could 
then not have been incidental to arrest and therefore 
would have breached s. 8. But the Supreme Court 
agreed that the officer did have reasonable grounds 
to arrest the accused for possession of a controlled 
substance under s. 495(1)(a). In its view, “the 
evidence was sufficient to support [the trial judge’s] 
inference that the necessary grounds for arrest 
existed.” In holding  that it was reasonable for the 
officer to believe he was dealing  with more than 30 
grams of marihuana, the trial judge considered not 
only the smell but also the large amount of cash 
found in the accused’s pocket. In the Supreme 
Court’s view, the evidence supported the trial judge’s 
conclusions, the arrest under s. 495(1)(a) was lawful, 
and it did not violate the Charter’s protections 
against wrongful detention.
Search Incident to Arrest
Since the arrest was lawful, the Supreme Court 
upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the search 
was properly conducted incidental to arrest and did 
not violate s. 8.
Section 24(2) Charter
Although it was unnecessary to consider s. 24(2) 
since there was no Charter violations, the Supreme 
Court would have nonetheless agreed with the trial 
judge that the evidence was admissible. She 
considered and weighed the relevant factors in the 
24(2) analysis. The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
Editor’s note:  More detailed facts of this case were 
taken from the Alberta Court of Appeal judgement R. 
v. Loewen, 2010 ABCA 255.
BY THE BOOK:
Power of Arrest: Criminal Code
s.  495(1)(a) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant (a) a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, he believes has committed  or is 
about to commit an indictable offence ...
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REASONABLE SUSPICION 
REQUIRES OBJECTIVE FACTS
R. v. Savage, 2011 SKCA 65
At abou t 4 :30 pm po l ice in 
Saskatchewan stopped the accused 
for speeding. The officers were 
performing  traffic duties and had a 
drug  sniffing  dog  with them. The 
interior of the truck was somewhat cluttered with 
food wrappers, drink bottles and maps, there was a 
very strong, almost overpowering, odour of air 
freshener emitting  from the vehicle, and both 
windows were down. The accused was extremely 
nervous. His hands were shaking, he was trembling 
and breathing  rapidly, his carotid artery was visibly 
pulsating, and his voice was cracking. The vehicle 
and the accused were from Ontario and he said he 
was employed part-time in Alberta and was 
travelling  back and forth for that purpose. Police 
thought this explanation for travel was a bit odd, as 
it involved long  distance travel for part-time work. 
Although they had noted a number of “flags” that 
alerted them to the possibility that the accused might 
be transporting  contraband, the officers did not yet 
believe they had grounds to detain the accused for 
further investigation. These flags were: 
• his extreme nervousness; 
• the cluttered appearance of the truck’s interior; 
• the somewhat odd explanation of why he was 
travelling; 
• the very strong  smell of air freshener and the 
open passenger side window, suggesting  it 
could be used to mask the smell of 
contraband; and 
• the fact that he was travelling  west to east, with 
the destination of a large urban centre.
A computer check revealed that the accused had a 
criminal record, including  a conviction about 18 
years before for trafficking  in drugs. At this point an 
officer opined that he now had sufficient grounds to 
detain. This criminal record, in his view, was the 
tipping  point so that the accumulation of suspicious 
factors gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the 
accused might be transporting  drugs. The drug  dog 
was then deployed and a positive hit at the rear of 
the vehicle was made. The accused was arrested and 
the truck was searched as an incident to arrest. Four 
pounds of marijuana divided in eight half pound 
bags were found, rolled up in a sleeping  bag  and 
tucked in the box of the truck. The accused was 
charged with possession of marijuana for the 
purpose of trafficking  contrary to s. 5(2) of the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
A Saskatchewan Provincial Court judge determined 
that the factors relied upon by the officers did not 
support a reasonable suspicion to detain the accused 
nor deploy the sniffer dog. She noted the absence of 
positive indications of drug  possession, such as a 
smell of marijuana or the presence of drug 
paraphernalia, and that the accused was not driving 
a vehicle owned by a third party. Each individual 
factor, relied upon by the officers, when taken alone 
was innocuous. “[T]he police officer did not have a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused was guilty of 
an on-going  criminal offence,” she said. “A hunch is 
not good enough, even though in hindsight, the 
police were right. In this case, all of the relevant 
evidence, considered collectively, does not satisfy 
the reasonable suspicion test of criminal activity.” 
Since the grounds for the arrest arose from the sniffer 
dog  hit, the arrest was unlawful, the physical search 
of the vehicle unreasonable, and the evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2). The accused was acquitted.
On appeal by Crown the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal found the trial judge imposed an unduly 
high standard in evaluating  the facts relied upon by 
the investigating  officers to justify a reasonable 
suspicion that the accused might be transporting 
illegal drugs. She confounded the threshold of 
reasonable suspicion with that of reasonable and 
probable grounds: 
Although neither requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, there is a significant 
distinction between the test of objectively 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
a crime has been committed and the test of 
objectively reasonable suspicion that a crime is 
being or has been committed. The former 
requires that the factors relied upon have 
enough probative value to establish the 
probability that the suspect is implicated in 
criminal activity. This is the threshold required 
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for a lawful arrest and a 
physical search incident to 
a r res t . The s tandard fo r 
reasonable suspicion, the 
threshold for investigative 
d e t e n t i o n a n d f o r t h e 
deployment of a sniffer dog, is 
less stringent. This requires that 
the police have more than a 
m e r e h u n c h , b a s e d o n 
intuition gained by experience. They must be 
able to point to objective facts that support the 
suspicion. However, the lower standard does not 
require that the officers be able to point to 
factors sufficient to establish the probability of 
the crime. Reasonable suspicion is a lower 
standard and can be established by less 
evidence, with less probative value, than 
reasonable and probable cause. [para. 18]
Although a “positive indication” of drug  possession, 
such as the presence of an odour of marihuana or 
drug  paraphernalia in plain view, could well provide 
reasonable grounds for an arrest their absence is not 
determinative in relation to the test for reasonable 
suspicion. Moreover, “the trial judge erred in failing 
to assess or to appreciate the probative value, or the 
relevance, of the factors cited by the officers as 
grounding  their suspicion,” said Justice Smith, 
authoring  the Court’s opinion. “The test is not 
whether there might be an innocent explanation. It 
is whether the presence of such a fact enhances or 
makes more likely the possibility of the crime at 
issue. In my respectful view, each of the factors 
relied upon by the officers was objectively relevant 
to and logically probative of their ultimate 
suspicion.” The Court of Appeal then went on to 
view the factors cited by police:
• the strong and almost over powering smell of 
air freshener. “While this is by no means 
inconsistent with innocent activity, and is 
therefore far from conclusive, the officers were 
able to point to their experience that air 
freshener is often used by those transporting 
drugs to mask the smell of the contraband. 
Thus, the presence of this factor makes it more 
likely, than would its absence, that contraband 
is present. More than that, however, an 
innocent use of a very strong  masking  agent, 
while possible, is improbable. It is, in 
fact, an unusual circumstance that 
dist inguishes the truck of the 
[accused] from the vast majority of 
trucks traveling  at the same time on 
the same highway. Accordingly, the 
probative value of this factor is of 
some considerable significance. It is 
not ‘innocuous’.” 
• the untidy appearance of the interior of the 
vehicle. This “is less probative, because less 
unusual, but it is not devoid of probative value. 
Again, the officers were able to point to their 
experience that the vehicles of those 
transporting  drugs over a long  distance often 
have a ‘lived in’ look, with evidence of eating 
and often sleeping  in the vehicle. This is 
because drug  couriers generally do not wish to 
stop for meals or hotels and leave the vehicle 
unattended. At the same time, of course, many 
travelers eat in their car and are untidy. 
Nonetheless, this factor is not entirely 
‘innocuous’.”
• nervousness. “[M]any people not guilty of 
criminal activity might exhibit signs of 
nervousness when stopped by the police, even 
for minor traffic violations, and some might 
show s igns o f ex t reme nervousness . 
Nonetheless, nervousness beyond what the 
police would normally expect, while far from 
conclusive, is not an irrelevant or completely 
innocuous factor. It has probative value making 
more likely the possibility of criminal activity.”
• the travelling direction, destination, and travel 
explanation of the occupants. “[T]he fact that a 
vehicle is traveling  from west to east has very 
weak probative value. Probably half the 
vehicles on the road are traveling  in this 
direction. Nonetheless, it is not entirely devoid 
of relevance, since this is, in the officers’ 
experience, the normal direction for drug 
traffic. That the travel destination is an urban 
centre demands a similar analysis. Its probative 
value is very weak, but not non-existent, since 
drugs are more likely to be destined to a large 
urban centre where drug  use would be higher 
“Reasonable suspicion is a 
lower standard and can be 
established by less 
evidence, with less probative 
value, than reasonable and 
probable cause.”  
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than in a small centre or rural 
a rea . Final ly, whether an 
explanation of the reasons for 
the travel or the itinerary is odd, 
inconsistent or unusual is often a 
matter of debate, but it does 
require some analysis by the trial 
judge, because it can be an 
indication that it is an invented 
story to cover a more nefarious 
purpose for the trip. These 
factors are often of limited 
significance, considered alone, 
but may nonetheless be of some 
relevance when taken together 
with other factors considered.”
• criminal record. “A criminal 
record of a previous conviction 
for drug  trafficking, even a 
record 18 years old, clearly has 
some probative value, making 
the possibility that the [accused] 
is carrying  drugs more likely 
than it would be had he no 
record at all in this regard. That it 
is far from conclusive does not 
make it innocuous.”
Here, the trial judge failed to give any consideration 
to the probative value of the facts relied upon by the 
officers under the mistaken view that if they were 
susceptible to an innocent explanation they could 
be accorded no weight. She also failed to give 
appropriate consideration to the probative value of 
the factors when considered collectively:
The point of considering the factors collectively 
is that, to pass the threshold for reasonable 
suspicion, no one factor is likely to have 
compelling probative value, and the value of 
some may be very weak, having  significance at 
all only when considered together with other 
factors. In addition, while a generalized 
suspicion of something wrong  cannot justify a 
search using  a sniffer dog, some of these factors 
may operate to focus the suspicion on a 
particular criminal activity. …
To establish the threshold for 
reasonable suspicion the police 
needed only to point to objectively 
discernible facts which support a 
reasonable suspicion that the 
[accused] was transporting drugs. In 
this case, on a proper consideration 
of the relevance and probative value 
of the factors relied upon by the 
police, it is my view that that 
threshold was clearly crossed. Of 
particular significance, and of 
strongest probative value, were the 
use of an odour masking agent and 
the [accused’s] criminal record, for 
these both served to distinguish him 
sharply from the average traveler and 
to relate his nervousness to the 
particular activity of transporting 
i l legal drugs. The [accused’s] 
nervousness, insofar as it was 
unusual was also relevant to heighten 
suspicion. The untidy interior of the 
vehicle and the travel destination and 
explanation for travel were in this 
particular case significantly less 
probative, but nonetheless relevant 
factors in the overall constellation of 
factors considered by the police 
officers. [paras. 29-30]
The investigative detention of the accused and the 
deployment of the sniffer dog  did not violate the 
Charter and, following  the positive hit by the sniffer 
dog, the arrest was based on reasonable grounds to 
believe that he was transporting  illegal drugs. The 
search of the vehicle that uncovered the marijuana 
was a lawful search incident to arrest. The Crown’s 
appeal was allowed, the accused’s acquittal set 
aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“[The standard for 
reasonable suspicion] 
requires that the police 
have more than a mere 
hunch, based on 
intuition gained by 
experience. They must 
be able to point to 
objective facts that 
support the suspicion. 
However, the lower 
standard does not 
require that the 
officers be able to 
point to factors 
sufficient to establish 
the probability of the 
crime.”  
JIBC announces two 
new Graduate Certificates in 
Tactical Criminal Analysis and 
Intelligence Analysis.
see page 36
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REASONABLE SUSPICION NEAR 
BOTTOM END OF CONTINUUM
R. v. Mackenzie, 2011 SKCA 64
After making  a u-turn police caught 
up with the accused two kilometers 
down the highway to warn him about 
speeding. He pulled his vehicle over 
to the side of the road despite not 
receiving  any direction to do so. Without apparent 
prompting  the accused said he was “sorry” and that 
he knew he had been speeding. The officer 
confirmed speeding  as the reason for the stop and 
asked for the accused’s driver’s licence and vehicle 
registration, which were provided. His hands were 
shaky and trembling, he was sweating, breathing 
very rapidly, his carotid artery was pulsing  very 
rapidly, and his eyes had a pinkish colour to them. 
When asked if he was alright the accused pointed 
down to some asthma medication on the console of 
the vehicle, said he had asthma, and requested to 
take some. After the accused took the medication 
the officer could not see any noticeable decrease in 
his breathing  or other observations. When asked, the 
accused said he was coming  from Calgary and going 
to Regina, his home. He seemed to be somewhat 
confused on when he had traveled to Calgary. Even 
though a computer check came back negative, the 
officer suspected that the accused was involved in a 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) 
offence based on his observations and experience, 
which included a standardized field sobriety-testing 
(SFST) course, Pipeline and Advanced Pipeline 
training, and over 5,000 traffic stops involving  150 
discoveries of drugs. The accused was asked to step 
out of the vehicle, advised he was going  to be 
detained for further investigation under the CDSA, 
and was told of his Charter rights. A drug  sniffing 
dog  was deployed and conducted a 
sniff-search around the exterior of 
the vehicle. The dog  indicated on 
the back hatch area and the 
accused was arrested. He was again 
given his rights. The vehicle was 
then physically searched and 31.5 
pounds of marijuana in three gift-
wrapped packages was found in the 
rear hatch area. The accused was 
charged with possessing  marihuana for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
A Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench judge 
properly identified a “reasonable suspicion” as the 
standard for conducting  a sniff-search using  a drug 
dog. However, the accused’s very high level of 
nervousness, his pinkish eyes, which in the police 
officer’s opinion was consistent with the use of 
marihuana, and the course of travel from Calgary (a 
source of drugs) to Regina (a known destination of 
sale), did not meet this standard. “There appeared to 
be no other signs that indicated the presence of 
illegal drugs such as plain sight or smell,” said the 
judge. “At best he was acting  on a hunch.” The 
judge opined that it was “quite conceivable that the 
observations of the accused claimed to have been 
noticed by [the officer] were enhanced after the 
drugs were located.” The sniff-search was 
unreasonable and breached s. 8  of the Charter 
(unreasonable search and seizure). The marihuana 
was excluded under s. 24(2) and, without the 
marijuana as evidence, there was no case and the 
accused was acquitted. The Crown then appealed to 
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. 
Controlling Standard
 
Although the use of a sniffer-dog  as an investigative 
technique constitutes a search under s. 8  of the 
Charter, police officers can conduct sniff-searches 
without prior judicial authorization on a 
“reasonable suspicion” standard. “A peace officer 
may deploy a sniffer-dog  to search a vehicle where 
that officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the presence of a “controlled substance”, within the 
meaning  of the [CDSA],” said Justice Caldwell for 
the unanimous Court.  “The standard of “reasonable 
suspicion” is less demanding  than that of 
“reasonable and probable grounds”; 
however, there is no comprehensive set 
of evolved criteria which control 
whether the standard has been met. 
Each case turns on its own facts.” The 
Court continued:
The assessment of the reasonableness 
of a sniff-search requires a thorough 
understanding of the standard to be 
“The standard of 
‘reasonable suspicion’ 
is near the bottom end 
on the continuum of 
probability (with proof 
‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ at the other).”  
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met and of the circumstances leading to the 
search. The standard of “reasonable suspicion” is 
near the bottom end on the continuum of 
probability (with proof “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” at the other). In any case, the court must 
undertake a subjective and objective analysis of 
whether the state has met its burden. For a sniff-
search, this analysis would have the court ask:
(a) Did the peace officer subjectively believe that 
there were reasonable grounds to suspect the 
accused was in possession of a controlled 
substance?
(b) Were there sufficient objective grounds to 
reasonably suspect the accused was in 
possession of a controlled substance? [at para. 
19]
Was the Standard Met?
In this case, the Court of Appeal accepted that the 
trial judge concluded the officer believed he had 
proper grounds to deploy the sniffer-dog  (subjective 
analysis). As for the sufficiency of the objective 
grounds to support a reasonable suspicion that the 
accused was in possession of a controlled substance, 
the Crown argued, in part, that the trial judge 
applied a too demanding standard. 
In deciding  whether a suspicion is reasonable a 
“judge must examine the factual circumstances 
leading  to the sniff-search and whether, considered 
with an appreciation of the peace officer’s training 
and experience, those circumstances could have 
reasonably given rise to a suspicion of possession of 
a controlled substance,” said Justice Caldwell. The 
scrutiny of warrantless searches, done after the fact, 
must be rigorous. However, the analysis of a 
reasonable suspicion does not involve a search for 
motive. It is also important that a trial judge take into 
consideration the experience and training  of the 
officer when determining  the objective existence of 
a standard of probability like reasonable suspicion 
or reasonable and probable grounds. Experience and 
training  must also be carefully assessed in the 
context of the standard of reasonable suspicion. 
In this case, the officer had more than a hunch. He 
carefully articulated the factors which led him to 
form a suspicion that the accused was involved in 
criminal activity and why he believed that that 
criminal activity was possessing  a controlled 
substance:
• His erratic driving  and overreaction to police 
presence in slowing  to 20 km/h below the speed 
limit and pulling  over before the police signaled 
him to do so. This was behaviour from which 
the officer’s experience had taught him to infer 
that the accused might be hiding  something 
from the police;
• His extremely high level of nervousness, which 
was “probably some of the highest nervousness 
that [he’d] seen in a traffic stop.” In addition, 
when the accused was told of the relatively 
minor reason for the stop, his level of 
nervousness did not diminish. This was 
behaviour which, in the officer’s experience, 
further indicated the accused had something  to 
hide;
• His hands were shaky and trembling  when 
handing  his driver’s licence and registration 
over. This was indicia of nervousness and, in the 
officer’s training, a symptom of marijuana use;
• He was sweating  with beads of sweat forming 
on his forehead. This was indicia of excessive 
nervousness;
• He was breathing  very rapidly, his chest was 
moving  in and out very quickly, and this rapid 
breathing  was audible when speaking. This was 
indicia of excessive nervousness;
• His carotid artery was pulsing  very rapidly. This 
was a sign of a high level of nervousness and 
something  the officer had experienced in traffic 
stops “where criminality was involved”;
• The accused’s nervousness was significant 
enough to prompt the officer to inquire about 
his health, but his rate of breathing  and other 
indicia of nervousness did not noticeably 
decrease after he took his asthma medication. 
(i.e. absence of a discernible reason for 
symptoms of nervousness);
• His eyes had a pinkish colour to them. This was 
a symptom known to the officer by training  and 
experience to be associated with marijuana use;
• He seemed confused as to his travel itinerary. 
This was something  that the officer had 
observed in individuals who were trying  to 
avoid detection of a crime by hastily making  up 
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a story but then forgetting  the details of the 
story;
• He was travelling  from Calgary (a city known to 
the officer as a distribution point for drugs) to 
Regina (a city known to the officer as a 
destination point for drugs) along  the Trans 
Canada Highway (a route known to the officer 
as being used by drug couriers);
• He was on a quick turnaround trip. In the 
officer’s experience, drug  couriers make quick 
turnaround trips; and
• Neither the Canadian Police Information Centre 
(CPIC) database nor the Police Information 
Retrieval System (PIRS) database contained any 
record of the accused. There was no discernible 
reason for the extreme degree of nervousness 
exhibited.
All of these factors “synergistically” caused the 
officer to suspect the presence of a controlled 
substance. But the trial judge simply reduced these 
factors to only three (i.e., “very high level of 
nervousness”, “pinkish hue of the driver’s eyes”, and 
“course of travel”). The latter two were then 
characterized as an “opinion” that was unsupported 
by evidence and the inferences drawn by the officer 
were discounted. In doing  so, “the judge failed to 
appreciate the constable’s issue-specific knowledge, 
training  and experience and thereby ignored the 
probative value of the constable’s evidence as 
informed opinion,” said the Court of Appeal. “The 
constable’s testimony about the factors that led him 
to draw the overall inference that drugs might be 
present in [the accused’s] vehicle must be seen and 
weighed not in terms of unsubstantiated opinion, but 
with an appreciation of [the officer’s] training  and 
experience.” Nervousness, a natural human 
condition observable, describable and appreciable 
(or objectively verifiable), by anyone, required an 
interpretation by the officer. Here, the accused was 
“extremely nervous”, probably some of the highest 
nervousness the officer had ever seen in a traffic 
stop: 
As a factor unto itself, nervousness alone might 
not ground a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity; but, here, the constable grounded his 
suspicion on more than the existence of 
nervousness. [The officer] also testified to [the 
accused’s] erratic driving  (an overreaction to 
police presence), to the extreme degree of [his] 
nervousness, to the absence of abatement in the 
degree of nervousness given the relatively 
insignificant reason for the traffic stop, and to the 
absence of any apparent reason for such a high 
degree of nervousness. In this sense, [the officer] 
drew upon his experience and training to 
contextualize [the accused’s] nervousness, 
which lent a tenor to that nervousness; one with 
the shade of potential criminal wrongdoing on 
the part of [the accused].
Furthermore, the constable said his experience 
and training  suggested that an individual with a 
“pinkish” eye colour might have recently 
consumed marijuana. On cross-examination, the 
constable testified that while use of marijuana 
does not necessarily mean an individual is 
transporting  marijuana, in his experience, 
“people that use marihuana usually have 
marihuana.” Logically, however, not everyone 
who exhibits pinkish eye colour has recently 
used marijuana, let alone is in the process of 
transporting drugs, and the constable did not 
suggest otherwise; nor is it likely that everyone 
who has recently used marijuana is in 
possession of it. But, when the standard is 
reasonable suspicion, the law does not require 
hard certainty as to the inferences drawn by a 
peace officer. Even where equally or even more 
persuasive inferences may be drawn from the 
observations, a judge may find that the peace 
officer’s inferences, when considered with an 
appreciation of the officer’s training  and 
experience, are reasonably supported by the 
factors articulated. A trial judge should be 
reluctant to discard such inferences as wrongly 
drawn without some analysis of why they were 
not appropriate.
In this case, it was also reasonable to place all of 
the constable’s observations and inferences 
within the context of his knowledge that drug 
couriers use the TransCanada Highway for quick 
turnaround trips when transporting  drugs from 
Calgary to Regina. While the circumstances 
might not have suggested the presence of drugs 
to someone not having [the officer’s] training 
and experience, and while there may be other 
plausible and innocent explanations for the 
pinkish eyes and trembling  hands observed by 
the constable, those factors support a suspicion 
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of potential criminal wrongdoing and, more 
importantly, wrongdoing involving drugs. [paras. 
34-36]
Although close to the line, the constellation of 
objective factors in this case were enough for the 
officer to reasonably suspect that the accused 
unlawfully possessed a controlled substance. The 
reasonable suspicion standard was satisfied. The 
warrantless sniffer-dog  search of the vehicle’s 
exterior was reasonable. Since the sniff-search was 
reasonable, then the subsequent physical search 
pursuant to the accused’s arrest was permitted and 
the marijuana was admissible. The Crown’s appeal 
was allowed and a new trial was ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
OFFICER SAFETY ALERT CAN 
FORM PART OF GROUNDS
R. v. Plummer, 2011 ONCA 350
 
The accused met his girlfriend who 
had parked her car in the fire lane 
beside his apartment. He brought his 
girlfriend’s overnight bag  with him, 
which she had left at his home the 
night before, and sat in the passenger seat of the 
car which was registered to his girlfriend’s mother. 
Two police officer’s saw the car parked facing  the 
wrong  way in a clearly marked no-parking  zone and 
they knew that the door of the apartment building 
closest to the car was used for drug  buys. As they 
passed by the car the police officers saw an 
expression of surprise or shock on the accused’s face 
and they saw him move downward in his seat, 
bending  forward and slouching  down. Police 
thought that his movements were  consistent with 
concealing  drugs. The officers made a u-turn and 
came back to investigate the car and its occupants. 
They asked the occupants for their names and they 
immediately associated the accused’s name with an 
officer safety alert that had circulated a week before. 
It described the accused as possibly armed with a 
handgun and in possession of a bulletproof vest. 
Believing  there were grounds to search the accused 
because of the alert, his reaction to seeing  the 
police, and his apparent attempt to hide something, 
police asked him to exit the vehicle. During  a pat-
down an officer felt the bulletproof vest. Police then 
proceeded to the car with a view to searching  it to 
determine if there was a gun. They first checked 
under the passenger’s seat and, when the bag  was 
searched, the accused fled. 
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge concluded the accused’s detention was lawful. 
The alert, the accused’s reaction to seeing  the police, 
and his suspicious conduct in the car as if he was 
concealing  something  provided a “constellation of 
factors” for the officers to embark on an investigative 
detention. The pat-down search was also lawful. The 
officer was honestly concerned for the safety of the 
people in the vicinity and the police. This concern 
was also objectively reasonable. Once the 
bulletproof vest was found the level of suspicion was 
raised to entitle a search of the area in the car where 
the police had seen the accused acting  suspiciously 
as if he was concealing  something. “[W]here the 
police see conduct consistent with concealing 
something  in the area of the front passenger seat, 
have information the person may be carrying  a gun 
and wearing  a bullet proof vest, and confirm he is 
wearing  a bullet proof vest, to find that the police 
had to stop their search once they found he was not 
carrying  a gun on him, flies in the face of concerns 
The Officer Safety Alert
*** POSSIBLY ARMED WITH A HANDGUN ***
ON 26 AUGUST 2006, UNIFORM PERSONNEL 
RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A 
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REGARDING 
ANDREW “BUBBA” PLUMMER. PLUMMER IS 
THE BROTHER OF ANDREW LAWRENCE – 
1985-11-19 – THE INTENDED TARGET OF A 
SHOOTING ON ORENDA COURT ON 3 AUGUST 
2006.
INFORMATION RECEIVED IS THAT PLUMMER 
IS ACTIVELY ATTEMPTING TO AVENGE THE 
SHOOTING AND THAT HE IS IN POSSESSION OF 
A HANDGUN WHICH HE CARRIES IN HIS 
WAISTBAND. INFORMATION HAS ALSO BEEN 
RECEIVED THAT PLUMMER IS ALSO IN 
POSSESSION OF A BULLETPROOF VEST.
ANY OFFICER DEALING WITH ANDREW 
PLUMMER SHOULD USE CAUTION AS HE IS 
PRESUMED TO BE ARMED AND DANGEROUS.
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for officer safety,” said the judge. And even if the 
police breached ss. 8  and 9 of the Charter the gun 
would nonetheless be admissible under s. 24(2). The 
accused was convicted of possessing  a prohibited 
weapon, possessing  a firearm in a motor vehicle, 
possessing  a firearm contrary to a prohibition order, 
and other related offences. He was sentenced to 16 
months in jail in addition to the 16 months of pre-
trial custody. The accused then appealed arguing  the 
detention was unlawful, the search of the bag  inside 
the car was unreasonable, and the gun should have 
been excluded as evidence.
The Detention
All three Ontario Court of Appeal 
justices agreed that the detention in 
this case was lawful. “The threshold 
of reasonable grounds for an 
investigative detention must be 
determined through an examination 
of the totality of the circumstances,” 
said Justice MacPherson. As part of 
this analysis a court can properly 
consider an accused’s body language 
and movements such as their 
reaction to seeing  the police and 
movements that are consistent with attempting  to 
conceal something. “There is abundant authority for 
observations of reactions by suspects to police 
presence permissibly forming  part of the 
constellation of factors that may determine the 
legality of an investigative detention. The value of 
such evidence, if any, will inevitably be determined 
by its intersection with the myriad of other 
circumstances in play.” The Officer Safety Alert 
could also form part of the factors amongst the 
totality of the circumstances. “Although the 
information in the alert was stated to have come 
from a confidential informant (I regard this as a 
neutral, not a negative, factor), the trial judge 
properly focused on several features of the alert to 
find it deserving  of weight in the reasonable 
suspicion calculus: the alert provided recent 
information, it provided considerable detail about 
the suspect, and it provided information of motive,” 
said Justice MacPherson. Here, as found by the trial 
judge, the police did have reasonable grounds to 
conduct an investigative detention. 
The Search: Standing?
All three justices also agreed that the accused had 
no standing  to allege that the search of his 
girlfriend’s bag  violated his s. 8 Charter rights 
because he had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the thing  searched (his girlfriend’s bag) nor 
in the thing  seized (the gun). First, the accused was 
not the owner of the car – it was his girlfriend’s 
mother’s. Nor was he the driver. “He was not even a 
passenger in the car,” said Justice MacPherson. “He 
was simply sitting  in the front passenger seat with 
the door open and his feet dangling  outside.” 
Second, the accused did not have a privacy interest 
in the bag. It was his girlfriend’s and 
contained only her personal effects. The 
accused’s “connection to it was simply 
carrying  it from his apartment to her car 
when she came to retrieve it.” As for the 
gun, although it belonged to him, he 
abandoned it. “What the accused did in 
this case amounts to a form of double 
abandonment,” said Justice MacPherson. 
“First, he removed the gun from his 
person and hid it in his girlfriend’s bag. 
Second, he then ran away from the 
scene. Taken together, the [accused] first 
distanced himself from the gun, by placing  it in the 
bag, and then distanced himself from the bag  by 
running  away. In these circumstances, his potential 
privacy interest in the gun evaporated.”
The Search: How Far?
Although the accused did not having  standing  to 
challenge the search of the bag, the Court 
nevertheless considered the “difficult and 
contentious issue of whether the limited power to 
conduct a pat-down search to ensure officer safety 
should be extended to permit the search of bags and 
vehicles.” Even if the accused had standing, all three 
justices found that the search would not have 
violated s. 8  of the Charter, albeit through different 
approaches. Justices Sharpe and Laskin stated:
A search incidental to an investigative detention 
is defined and limited by the immediate 
concerns of officer safety.  This reflects an 
important difference between the narrowly 
focussed and strictly limited protective search 
“The threshold of 
reasonable grounds 
for an investigative 
detention must be 
determined through 
an examination of the 
totality of the 
circumstances it.”  
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that may accompany an investigative detention, 
and the broader power to search consequent to 
a lawful arrest.  It is necessary to maintain that 
distinction and to confine the scope of a search 
incidental to an investigative detention within 
strict limits.  Here, the police did not arrest the 
[accused], presumably because they did not 
think they had grounds for an arrest.  As the 
[accused] points out, there is an understandable 
tendency to expand a narrow rule to endorse the 
police conduct being  challenged, since the case 
before the court will always be one where the 
search actually yielded a weapon or some other 
valuable evidence. This is a tendency that the 
courts should resist.
However, on the facts as found by the trial 
judge, I agree that a modest extension of the 
Mann pat-down search was justified in this case.  
Although the officers had the [accused] under 
their temporary control, the situation was fluid.  
The [accused’s] earlier actions, when he 
appeared to conceal something in the vehicle, 
combined with the Officer Safety Alert 
indicating  that he might be carrying  a gun, gave 
rise to a legitimate serious concern that he had 
immediate access to a weapon that he could use 
if the officers were to simply release him and 
return to their own vehicle.
On those specific facts, I agree that the officers 
were entitled to search the bag in the car as an 
incident of the investigative detention to ensure 
their own immediate safety.  While this does 
represent a modest extension of the protective 
pat-down search in R. v. Mann, it is limited by 
the concern for immediate officer safety that 
underpins Mann. 
However, I would emphasize that this should 
not be read as giving  the police carte blanche 
power to permit searches of bags or vehicles 
incident to investigative detention. Such a search 
demands satisfactory proof of a serious concern 
for officer safety that requires something more 
than the initial pat-down. [paras. 76-79]
Justice MacPherson, in his reasons, noted that 
“where a police officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that his or her safety or the safety of others is 
at risk, the officer may engage in a protective pat-
down search of the detained individual.” This power 
of protective search incidental to an investigative 
detention is a limited common law power and will 
only be justified if it is “reasonably necessary, 
reasonably executed, and based on a reasonable 
belief by the police that officer safety or the safety of 
others is at risk in the totality of the circumstances.” 
Although the search is anchored in safety concerns 
and is limited to weapons, Justice MacPherson held 
there was nothing  confining  a search incidental to 
an investigative detention to only the person 
detained and could still comply with the common 
law and pass constitutional muster even if it went 
beyond a pat down. He rejected the accused’s bright 
line test that when a pat-down search of the person 
reveals no weapon, the detainee must be allowed to 
leave unencumbered by any other search. This, in 
his view, would shift the focus from balancing  the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches with 
legitimate safety concerns, to the location of the 
search. A legitimate police safety search is 
permissible on the basis of a valid protective 
purpose, not by whether the search is of the person, 
or of a particular place or object in the vicinity. 
Finally, Justice MacPherson also disagreed with the 
contention that when the car was searched there was 
no immediate risk to officer or public safety. Even 
though the police had the accused within their 
control and had found no weapon on his person, 
they had seen him apparently conceal something  in 
the car and found that he was wearing  a bulletproof 
vest. They still had an honest concern that he had 
immediate access to a weapon that was a threat to 
their safety and the safety of people in the vicinity. It 
was a high crime area, there had been recent 
shootings in the area, and there were children 
walking through the complex: 
Against this backdrop, I do not see why, once 
[the officer] discovered the bulletproof vest, he 
should be required to reject a further search for 
the gun in the immediate vicinity, including  the 
passenger side area of the car in which the 
[accused] had been seated moments before. To 
expect the police officer to abandon his search, 
release the [accused] and, in effect, turn his back 
on the [accused] as he walks back to the police 
cruiser is, in my view, both unrealistic and 
unreasonable. [para. 65]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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WARRANTLESS ARREST 
REQUIRES SUBJECTIVE BELIEF, 
OBJECTIVELY JUSTIFIED
R. v. Burke, 2011 NBCA 51
Three previously proven reliable 
confidential informers, who provided 
information independent from each 
other, told police that the accused 
received orders for cocaine by cell 
phone and delivered the drugs from his home using 
either a white minivan or a black pickup truck. They 
related having  either personally observed or 
participated in the illegal drug  transactions. The first 
informer said the accused was delivering  pre-
packaged cocaine and Dilaudid in either a white 
minivan or a black pickup 
truck. A few days later, the 
informer said he saw the 
accused delivering  cocaine in 
his pickup on the north side of 
the city. Later, the informer 
reported having  seen the 
accused with cocaine and 
Dilaudid in his white van and 
selling  a quantity of cocaine 
and Dilaudid again from it. A 
second informer provided 
information on eight occasions. 
He said that several times he 
had arranged for the accused to 
deliver cocaine and Dilaudid to 
him. He called a particular 
telephone number and the 
accused would then deliver the drugs. The police 
were able to verify the phone number as belonging 
to the accused. On two occasions the accused had 
delivered cocaine to the informant in a white 
minivan. A third informer said that within the past 
month he had bought cocaine or Dilaudid on at 
least a dozen occasions from the accused, who 
would use a white minivan or a black truck for 
deliveries. The phone number used to order drugs 
was the same number that had been reported by the 
second informer. The informer had sold and 
delivered cocaine within the past 24 hours and 
Dilaudid within the last 48  hours using  a white 
minivan. All of the information was passed on to the 
investigator who believed he had reasonable 
grounds to make an arrest and placed the accused 
under surveillance. The officer followed him as he 
proceeded in his white minivan to a Tim Hortons 
parking  lot and parked next to another vehicle, 
which was backed into a parking  space. The two 
drivers appeared to be talking  and after only one to 
two minutes, the two vehicles left the parking  lot 
without anyone exiting either vehicle.
The accused was stopped in the minivan he was 
driving  and arrested for possessing  controlled 
substances for the purpose of trafficking. He was 
patted down, searched, and $210 was seized from 
his coat pocket. He was advised of his right to 
consult counsel and initially stated he wanted to call 
his lawyer. After arriving  at the police station, 
however, he was unable to contact his 
own lawyer and declined the opportunity 
to call another one. When told he was 
going  to be strip searched he handed over 
two plastic bags, one containing  10.94 
grams of cocaine packaged into 14 
individual packets and the other 
containing  20 Dilaudid pills. In the 
minivan police found, among  other 
things, a cell phone with the same 
number reported by the informers and a 
wallet containing  four $20 bills. He was 
charged with two counts of possessing  a 
controlled substance for the purpose of 
trafficking  (cocaine and Hydromorphone 
(Dilaudid)) and possessing  proceeds of 
crime.
At trial in the New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused alleged his arrest was unlawful (s. 9 Charter 
breach) and the search unreasonable (s. 8  Charter 
breach). The trial judge agreed and excluded the 
evidence obtained from the searches of his person 
and his vehicle. Although he found the arresting 
officer had the required subjective reasonable 
grounds, the objective component was deficient. 
There was much information about the accused’s 
activities over a series of months, but it was not 
objectively demonstrated that there were reasonable 
grounds “that [the accused] would have drugs in his 
possession for the purpose of trafficking  on that day 
at that time”. The trial judge felt more confirmation 
“Trafficking in cocaine 
and Dilaudid or 
possessing these drugs 
for the purpose of 
trafficking are indictable 
offences. It is not 
necessary for the officer 
to either find the person 
in the process of 
committing the offence or 
to have witnessed the 
commission of it.”  
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for present possession was required. The accused 
was acquitted. The Crown appealed, arguing, in part, 
that the trial judge erred by failing  to correctly apply 
the proper legal test in determining  whether there 
were reasonable and probable grounds for the 
warrantless arrest 
The powers of arrest for police are found in s. 495(1) 
of the Criminal Code. “As is evident from the 
language of s. 495(1)(a), an officer may arrest a 
person who, on reasonable grounds, the officer 
believes has committed an indictable offence,” said 
Justice Richard for the New Brunswick Court of 
Appeal. “Trafficking  in cocaine and Dilaudid or 
possessing  these drugs for the purpose of trafficking 
are indictable offences. It is not necessary for the 
officer to either find the person in the process of 
committing  the offence or to have witnessed the 
commission of it. The law is well established that, for 
a warrantless arrest to be valid, the arresting  officer 
must subjectively have reasonable grounds on which 
to base the arrest and those grounds must, in 
addition, be justifiable from an objective point of 
view. In other words, a reasonable person placed in 
the position of the officer must be able to conclude 
there were indeed grounds for the arrest.” Although 
Justice Richard concluded that the trial judge 
identified the correct “totality of the circumstances” 
legal test, he found it was not applied correctly. 
In the present case, the judge focused almost 
exclusively on the absence of independent 
evidence corroborating the information the 
informers had provided. In my respectful view, 
he elevated that circumstance to an essential 
prerequisite because he was focused not on 
whether there were reasonable grounds for the 
officer's belief that [the accused] had committed 
an indictable offence, but rather on the question 
whether there were grounds to believe [the 
accused] would be in possession of drugs at the 
time of his arrest.
The trial judge held that there was nothing more 
than suspicion for the officer's belief that [the 
accused] "would have drugs in his possession for 
the purpose of trafficking  on that day at that 
time", that is the date and time of the arrest. With 
respect, this is not the proper basis upon which 
the officer's belief ought to have been assessed. 
The proper question is whether there was an 
objective basis for the officer's belief that [the 
accused] had committed an indictable offence. If 
so, the officer was lawfully empowered to arrest 
him.
Had the judge asked himself the right question, 
he would have had to determine whether the 
reliability of any of the tips was satisfactorily 
established to provide the requisite grounds to 
arrest on the basis of the officer's subjective 
belief [the accused] had committed an 
indictable offence. In making  this determination, 
the judge was required to consider all the 
circumstances, including the following ... :
1.  Members of the Fredericton Police Drug 
Squad had been for some months gathering 
evidence about [the accused’s] activities;
2.  All three of the informers who provided 
information to the officers had proven reliable 
on many occasions;
3.  All three of the informers had personal 
knowledge of the drug  transactions in which [the 
accused] was involved, with two of them having 
themselves participated in the transactions;
4.  The informers provided significant detail 
regarding  the transactions, i.e. the types of drugs 
involved, the fact that the cocaine was pre-
BY THE BOOK:
Power of Arrest: Criminal Code
s.  495(1)(a) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, he believes has committed or is 
about to commit an indictable offence;
(b)  a person whom he finds committing  a criminal offence; 
or
(c) a  person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, in any form 
set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto,  is in force within 
the territorial jurisdiction in which the person is found.
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packaged, the method of communication used, 
the phone number (found to belong to [the 
accused]), the vehicles he used, and the part of 
the city in which the transactions took place (this 
detail corroborated the informers reports that 
they were closely acquainted with [the 
accused]);
5. There was no evidence of an improper motive 
underlying the reports of the informers; and
6.  There was no fact-based, as opposed to 
speculative, justification for the conclusion that 
the allegations of criminal conduct were 
unreliable.
In my respectful view, despite the judge's finding 
that the activity witnessed in the Tim Hortons 
parking lot was insufficient to corroborate the 
tips (a finding  upon which I am not required to 
comment), there was nevertheless more than 
sufficient objective support for the officer's belief 
that [the accused] had committed an indictable 
offence. The police had been told by three 
reliable sources who had personally witnessed 
multiple transactions that [the accused] had 
been trafficking in drugs. These informers, 
independent of one another, provided the police 
with sufficient detail regarding these transactions 
to guarantee the trustworthiness of each 
informer's disclosure, especially where the detail 
provided by one source was corroborated by the 
details provided by one or both of the other 
sources. Had the judge weighed all the 
circumstances, as he was required to do, and not 
elevated one to an almost prerequisite, he would 
necessarily have concluded there were sufficient 
indicia of the informers' reliability so as to justify 
an arrest solely on the basis of the information 
provided. [paras. 19-22]
The trial judge erred in finding  the arrest unlawful. 
Since the arrest was not unlawful, the detention was 
not arbitrary and the searches incident to the arrest 
were not unreasonable. The appeal was allowed, the 
acquittal was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
STATUTORILY COMPELLED 
STATEMENTS INADMISSIBLE FOR 
ESTABLISHING REASONABLE 
GROUNDS
R. v. Soules, 2011 ONCA 429
 
Following  a multi-vehicle collision, 
a police officer investigating  the 
incident spoke to each driver, asking 
them what happened.  In response, 
the accused identified himself as a 
driver.  Because of his observations the officer 
suspected that the accused had alcohol in his system 
and made an approved screening  device demand. 
The accused failed, was arrested for operating  a 
motor vehicle with more than 80 mg%, and was 
advised of his right to counsel. He was transported 
to the police station where he subsequently provided 
two samples of his breath into an approved 
instrument (143 mg% and 136 mg%). The accused 
was charged with over 80 mg%.
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
was acquitted. The trial judge found his Charter 
rights were violated under s. 7, which protects a 
person against self-incrimination, because his 
statement that he was the driver was compelled 
under Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act. The trial judge 
concluded that the accused remained at the scene of 
the collision and answered the officer’s questions 
because he understood that he was required by law 
to do so. The breath results were excluded under s. 
24 of the Charter  because, without the accused’s 
statement, there was no reasonable suspicion for the 
approved screening  device demand.   An appeal by 
Crown was dismissed by the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice. The s. 7 Charter  violation was upheld as 
was the exclusion of the breath results under s. 24.  
The Crown further challenged the acquittal.
 
The Crown submitted to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
that the rulings in this case had “the potential to 
cripple the investigation of drinking  and driving 
offences where a collision has occurred”.  The 
Crown suggested that the statements made by the 
accused were admissible for the limited purpose of 
establishing  that the officer had grounds to make an 
www.10-8.ca
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approved screening  device demand and such use 
did not violate the right against self-incrimination 
under s. 7. In support of its argument the Crown 
pointed out that a motorist’s compelled participation 
in an ASD test is admissible to support an officer’s 
grounds to make a breath demand, thus compelled 
statements made at the scene of a collision are also 
admissible when they are being  used for the same 
limited purpose.  The Crown, in the alternative, 
contended that if there was a s. 7 infringement it was 
justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter. 
 
Justice LaForme, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
rejected the Crown’s arguments. Statutorily 
compelled statements are only admissible to prove 
non-compliance under the Highway Traffic Act but 
not admissible for any other purpose including  for 
the purpose of establishing  reasonable grounds. 
Unlike breath testing  where a motorist’s compelled 
participation in an ASD test is admissible to support 
an officer’s grounds to make a breath demand, “the 
questioning  by police in those cases does not 
involve compelled answers. In each of them the 
motorist can refuse to answer if he or she chooses; 
they are not forcefully enlisted in aid of their own 
prosecution,” said the Court of Appeal. For example, 
in the case of a breath demand made by a police 
officer pursuant to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code, 
the motorist is legally obligated to comply with the 
demand; nevertheless, s. 7 continues to furnish him 
or her with the right to choose whether or not to 
speak with the police – a choice statutory 
compulsion clearly eradicates.   There is absolutely 
no legal compulsion to speak or provide information 
in any of the cases cited.” The accused’s statutorily 
compelled admission was not admissible for the 
purpose of establishing  grounds for making  either 
the ASD or the breath demand.  Unlike s. 10(b) 
where the right to counsel can be “limited until 
arresting  officers have developed reasonable 
grounds to effect an arrest, the choice of whether or 
not to remain silent – and thus prevent self-
incrimination – nevertheless remains.”
 
The Court of Appeal also commented on the 
Crown’s submission that not permitting  use 
immunity “has the potential to cripple the 
investigation of drinking  and driving  offences where 
a collision has occurred”.  Even though information 
BY THE BOOK:
Accident Reports: Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act
Duty to report accident    
s. 199  (1) Every person in charge of a 
motor vehicle or street car who is 
directly or indirectly involved in an 
accident shall, if the accident results 
in personal injuries or in damage to 
property apparently exceeding  an amount prescribed 
by regulation, report the accident forthwith to the 
nearest police officer and furnish him or her with the 
information concerning  the accident as may be 
required by the officer under subsection (3).
Officer may direct person to report accident at 
another location 
(1.1)  If, on reporting the accident to the nearest 
police officer under subsection (1), the person is 
directed by the officer to report the accident at a 
specified location, the person shall not furnish the 
officer described in subsection (1) with the 
information concerning the accident but shall 
forthwith attend at the specified location and report 
the accident there to a police officer and furnish him 
or her with the information concerning  the accident 
as may be required by the officer under subsection 
(3).
... ... ...
Duty of police officer        
(3)  A police officer receiving  a report of an accident, 
as required by this section, shall secure from the 
person making the report, or by other inquiries 
where necessary, the particulars of the accident, the 
persons involved, the extent of the personal injuries 
or property damage, if any, and the other information 
that may be necessary to complete a written report 
concerning the accident and shall forward the report 
to the Registrar within ten days of the accident.
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deriving  from the duty of a motorist by statutory 
compulsion cannot be used in a criminal proceeding 
there are other ways in which police might 
inves t igate so as to acquire in format ion 
independently of the accident report that can be 
used. For example, an officer may inform the driver 
that they intend to secure the details of the accident 
report from sources other than the driver, thus 
terminating  the statutory duty to report.  Or police 
might tell the driver that they will postpone the 
taking  of an accident report until after they have 
questioned him or her. With these alternatives, 
Justice LaForme concluded the Crown’s argument 
was unfounded.
 
Since there was no argument raised in the courts 
below that a s. 7 infringement was justifiable under 
s. 1 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal refused to 
consider it. The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
REASONABLE SUSPICION 
LACKING FOR DETENTION & 
DOG SNIFF
R. v. Blanchard, 2011 NLCA 33
 
Police stopped the accused for 
speeding  110 km/h in a 100 km/h 
zone. The highway was icy and 
police decided to warn the driver. 
The driver produced a driver's 
licence and admitted that he had been speeding  a 
bit. During  the initial contact the officer noticed 
some indicators that made him suspicious that the 
accused may be involved in criminal activity:
 
• The accused’s legs were shaking  uncontrollably. 
When asked why, the accused said "I don't 
know";
• His signs of nervousness did not subside even 
though the officer explained there would be no 
ticket;
• On the passenger side on the floor there was a 
McDonald's restaurant bag  being  used for 
garbage which was quite full indicating  that the 
driver had been traveling  for some time. The 
vehicle also contained a 2 liter pop bottle 
partially full, cheesies or chip packages on the 
seat and a pizza box on the floor in the back 
seat, all of which suggested that the driver was 
eating  on the run and trying  to get from point A 
to point B quickly;
• There was a cologne spray bottle in the center 
console and an air freshener in the vehicle. In 
the officer’s training  and  experience people 
carrying  drugs often use spray cologne and/or 
air fresheners as a masking  agent to cover up the 
smell of marihuana;
• On the passenger floor there was a map of Nova 
Scotia indicating  that the driver had likely come 
from that province, which the officer knew was 
a potential source province for the import of 
marihuana into Newfoundland;
• The back seat contained two duffle bags which 
suggested an overnight trip. There were also 
hubcaps close to the top surface of "other stuff" 
in the back seat suggesting  that there must be 
something  in the trunk displacing  the hubcaps 
which would normally be stowed there. 
Through his training  the officer had learned that 
people transporting  marihuana or other 
controlled substances often conceal them by 
putting them in the trunk.
 
A computer query on the accused’s licence and 
registration checked out fine. The officer returned the 
documents to the accused, told him about the road 
conditions, and indicated to him that he was free to 
go. The officer stepped back from the vehicle, 
gesturing  with his left arm that the accused could 
proceed down the road. Then, the officer stepped in 
again and asked "would you mind if I ask you a few 
more questions about your trip?” The accused said 
that he could. After a few questions the responses 
made the officer more suspicious. 
 
The officer felt he had a reasonable suspicion that 
the accused was involved in criminal activity, 
requested that he exit the vehicle, and placed him 
under detention. He read him his Charter right to 
counsel and the standard police warning. The 
accused requested to speak to a lawyer and was 
allowed to talk on the police telephone in the police 
car with Legal Aid while officers stood outside the 
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car. Once the call was completed the officer called a 
dog  handler to the scene to do a sniff around the 
vehicle. In the meantime, a request for a consent 
search of the vehicle was refused. Feeling  confident 
that a search was going  to be conducted a tow truck 
was called. After a 70 minute delay a 
dog  handler arrived and walked 
around the car, giving  two positive 
sit indications that there were drugs 
in the vehicle (once between the 
driver and rear doors on the driver's 
side and once at the trunk). The 
accused was then arrested for 
possession of a controlled substance 
for the purpose of trafficking  and re-
Chartered, cautioned, and warned. 
The vehicle was towed to the police 
detachment and a search warrant 
was obtained. The vehicle was 
subsequently searched and 59 half-
pound bags of marihuana were found in duffle bags 
in the back seat and in the trunk. The accused was 
charged with possession of marijuana for the 
purposes of trafficking.
 
A Newfoundland Supreme Court trial judge 
concluded that the accused was psychologically 
restrained and subject to an investigative detention 
when he was released from the “routine traffic stop” 
and the police started to ask a few more questions. 
In her view, the police should have advised the 
accused of his right to counsel and because they did 
not there was a breach of s. 10(b) while asking  the 
additional questions. Furthermore, the judge ruled 
that the police breached s. 9 of the Charter because 
they did not have sufficient cause to detain. “Treated 
collectively and objectively, on the facts before me, I 
am left with the picture of an extremely nervous 
young  driver (whose anxiety [the officer] said did not 
seem to abate despite being  advised that he was not 
being  given a ticket), traveling  the Trans Canada 
Highway eastbound at a time of day consistent with 
ferry traffic, with a map of another Atlantic Province 
and a cologne bottle in plain view,” said the judge. 
“These factors, in combination with the fast food 
containers and loaded back seat, were, in my 
opinion, insufficient to justify the reasonable 
suspicion test for the exercise of police authority to 
detain.” As for the time it took waiting  for the arrival 
of the dog  handler, the judge said it spoke “against 
the reasonableness of the investigative detention in 
the overall circumstances.” Since the police did not 
have a reasonable suspicion to detain the accused 
they did not have reasonable suspicion 
to conduct the perimeter sniff search. 
This search breached the accused’s s. 8 
Charter right and the arrest, which was 
based on the results of the sniff search, 
was unlawful as was the search warrant 
obtained later. The evidence, however, 
was admitted under s. 24(2). “I do not 
believe that to admit the drugs in these 
circumstances would either shock the 
conscience of the public or cause 
further loss of confidence in the 
administration of justice,” said the trial 
judge. “In fact, I believe the reverse to 
be true. I conclude that ‘a reasonable 
person, informed of all relevant circumstances and 
the values underlying  the Charter, would conclude 
that the [exclusion] of the evidence would bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute’”.   The 
accused was convicted.
 
The accused appealed to the Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal. Justice Rowe, authoring  the Court of 
Appeal’s opinion, substantially agreed with the 
findings of the trial judge regarding  the Charter 
violations. “Her key finding  was that the police did 
not have ‘reasonable suspicion’ to conduct the dog 
sniff,” he said. “This was critical, as the dog  sniff led 
to the search warrant, which led to discovery of the 
drugs, which led to [the accused’s] arrest. The 
unlawfulness of the dog  sniff caused this cascade of 
Charter violations.”
 
Although not required to do so, Justice Rowe made 
comment in obiter  about the delay in the dog 
handler arriving on scene:
 
I would raise a (perhaps heterodoxical) question. 
Provided there is a valid basis to call for a dog 
sniff, should it matter how long  it takes to get a 
dog on site, provided reasonable diligence is 
used by the police to do so? Given the vast scale 
of this country ... we are not Singapore ... in 
many places, of necessity, there will be 
“[T]he dog sniff led to 
the search warrant, 
which led to discovery 
of the drugs, which led 
to [the accused’s] 
arrest. The 
unlawfulness of the 
dog sniff caused this 
cascade of Charter 
violations.”  
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significant delays in getting  a dog to where it is 
needed. In such circumstances, why not release 
the individual, but impound the vehicle pending 
the dog's arrival? Otherwise, is not the 
investigation of drug cases seriously impaired 
outside of places where a sniffer dog is readily 
available? [para. 35]
 
As for the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis, Justice Rowe 
also agreed the evidence was admissible:  
 
What is critical is that the police believed they 
were acting lawfully and that they could not 
reasonably have been aware they were not so 
doing, in that their actions preceded the 
guidance provided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Kang-Brown, A.M. and Grant.
 
The police officers proceeded in a way that they 
reasonably believed was in accordance with 
law. They obtained evidence that was highly 
reliable. With the benefit of subsequent 
guidance from the Supreme Court we now know 
they violated [the accused’s] Charter rights. 
Some of those violations were significant; 
howeve r, none amoun ted to a g rave 
infringement on his liberty or personal dignity. 
That is important. [paras. 38-39]
 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was affirmed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
 ERROR TO TEST INDIVIDUAL 
PIECES OF EVIDENCE OFFERED 
TO ESTABLISH GROUNDS
R. v. Usher, 2011 BCCA 271
At about 3:00 am a civilian motorist 
called 911 to report that there was a 
possible impaired driver weaving  on 
the road and shoulder at varying 
speeds between 80 km/h and 130 
km/h, almost striking  another vehicle. A police 
officer intercepted the vehicle, followed it, and 
observed it was using  all of its lane to drive in and 
changed lanes without signalling. The officer 
activated the emergency lights on his marked police 
car but the accused did not pull over for about 1.5 
km. When asked where he was coming  from the 
accused’s response was difficult to understand and a 
bit slurred. He had a blank look on his face, his eyes 
were glassy, and he was slow and deliberate in his 
actions and speech. The accused said he “had a 
couple”, held up an open and partly-consumed can 
of beer, and there was an odour of liquor in the 
vehicle. When asked for his driver’s licence and 
registration the accused put them on his lap instead 
of handing  them to the officer. He then produced 
them when the officer asked again. When requested 
to get out of the vehicle the accused was unsure of 
his balance, but he did not stumble. He walked 
normally to the rear of the vehicle but his 
movements were slow and deliberate. At this time 
the officer noted a “quite strong” odour of alcohol 
coming  from the accused, who still appeared slow 
and dazed and his speech was slurred. Based on the 
driving  pattern reported by the civilian, his own 
observations, and the smell of alcohol from the 
accused, the officer formed the opinion that the 
accused’s ability to drive a vehicle was impaired by 
alcohol. The accused was arrested, the breath 
demand administered, and he subsequently 
provided two samples of his breath producing 
readings of 160 mg% and 150 mg%. He was 
charged with over 80 mg% and impaired driving. 
At trial in the British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer was  unable to provide details or examples of 
the slurred speech except for their conversation at 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Murder & Motive
“Motive is not an element of the 
offence of murder. Murders are 
sometimes committed in the 
absence of motive. However, 
proof of motive assists in the 
establishing the necessary mens rea of the offence ... “ - 
Alberta Court of Appeal Justice Ritter in R. v. Martel, 
2011 ABCA 114 at para. 21. 
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the outset. He said that the accused 
“seemed off” and “not quite right” 
and that he looked like a drunk 
person. The officer also said that 
the accused looked noticeably 
different at court than he had been 
during  their encounter. He was 
alert and not confused or dazed as 
he had been on that night. The 
accused testified he had consumed 
two to three rye and coke and 
some beer before he drove about 
two-and-a-half hours prior to being 
stopped and two to three beers 
while driving. He argued that the 
officer did not have reasonable 
grounds to believe he committed an offence under 
s.  253 and therefore the breath samples were 
obtained in violation of his rights under s. 8  of the 
Charter. 
The trial judge acknowledged that the officer had the 
necessary subjective belief that the accused’s ability 
to drive was impaired by alcohol. However, he ruled 
that the officer’s belief was not objectively 
reasonable. He found the officer’s actual experience 
with impaired drivers was somewhat limited. 
Furthermore, the strong  smell of alcohol emanating 
from the accused was a significant symptom of 
impairment for the officer. But the officer did not 
testify where the strong  smell came from and the 
judge was not prepared to infer that the odour was 
coming  from his mouth. “There are any number of 
possibilities as to why a person would give off a 
strong  smell of alcohol other than having  consumed 
it,” said the judge. “For example, since [the accused 
had been drinking  as he drove along, it is 
conceivably possible alcohol had been spilled on 
[his] clothing. Unless the strong  smell was from [the 
accused’s] breath, it would not have been realistic 
for [the officer] to believe the strong  smell was 
caused by [the accused] having  consumed alcohol.” 
The breath certificates, however, were admitted as 
evidence and the accused was convicted of driving 
while over 80 mg%, but he was acquitted of 
impaired driving. 
The accused  appealed his conviction to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court arguing  the trial judge 
erred in admitting  the breathalyzer 
readings under s.  24(2) of the 
Charter. The Crown, on the other 
hand, submitted that the trial judge 
erred in finding  there was no 
objective basis for the breathalyzer 
demand and, even if there was a 
Charter breach, the trial judge’s 
ruling  under s.  24(2) was correct. 
The appeal judge upheld the lower 
court’s judgments on both points. 
He agreed with the trial judge’s 
finding  of a s.  8 Charter  breach 
because the objective component 
required for reasonable grounds for 
the breathalyzer demand had not 
been satisfied. As well, he agreed that the trial judge 
was not incorrect in admitting  the evidence. The 
accused's appeal was dismissed. 
The accused then appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal submitting  that both the trial judge 
and the appeal judge erred in admitting  the 
breathalyzer results under s.  24(2). The Crown 
argued again that the judges below erred in finding 
that the officer lacked objective grounds to make the 
breath demand. And if they didn’t err,  the Crown 
maintained that both judges correctly ruled the 
breath samples were admissible under s. 24(2).
Objective Reasonable Grounds 
Under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code a peace officer 
is authorized in making  a demand for breath 
samples if the officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that the suspect’s ability to drive was 
impaired by alcohol within the preceding  three 
hours. “The requirement of reasonable grounds has 
both a subjective and objective component,” said 
Justice Neilson writing  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion. “The officer must subjectively have an 
honest belief that the suspect committed an offence, 
and that belief must be supported by objective 
grounds.” In this case, the officer had the necessary 
subjective belief that the accused’s ability to drive 
was impaired. However, the trial judge ruled that the 
objective basis for that belief was not reasonable. In 
looking  at the objective test for reasonable grounds 
Justice Neilson put it this way:
“The test for establishing 
reasonable grounds is not 
onerous. The Crown need 
not establish a prima facie 
case; it will be enough to 
show the findings of fact 
objectively support the 
officer’s subjective belief 
that the suspect was 
impaired, even to a slight 
degree.”  
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The test for establishing reasonable 
grounds is not onerous. The Crown 
need not establish a prima facie 
case; it will be enough to show the 
findings of fact objectively support 
the officer’s subjective belief that the 
suspect was impaired, even to a 
slight degree. As well, the authorities 
recognize the reasonableness of the 
officer’s opinion must be judged by 
reference to the totality of the 
circumstances, and in the situation in 
which it was formed; a roadside 
investigation that demands a quick 
and informed decision, without the 
luxury of reflection. [references 
omitted, para. 30]
Using  these principles the Court of 
Appeal concluded the trial judge erred. The accused 
had been driving  erratically and was drinking  as he 
drove. He demonstrated a number of the standard 
physical signs and symptoms of impairment. These 
facts provided a reasonable basis for a breathalyzer 
demand:
An opinion as to whether a person’s ability to 
drive is impaired is not an expert opinion, and 
may be given by a lay person. Indeed, the fact 
one witness has seen more impaired drivers than 
another is not in itself enough to prefer the 
evidence of the more experienced witness. 
Having  said that ... the authorities recognize a 
police officer’s experience may strengthen his/her 
opinion but, typically, this is expressed in terms 
of an ability to recognize and interpret subtleties 
that may not be apparent to a layperson. 
[references omitted, para. 34]
In this case the officer was a credible witness. He 
had particular skill and training  concerning  impaired 
drivers, and was in a better position than a layperson 
to assess symptoms of impairment. Furthermore, the 
trial judge erred by placing  too much weight on the 
officer being  unable to testify that the odour of 
alcohol emanated from the accused’s breath. “It is 
trite law that, in assessing  whether the Crown has 
established reasonable grounds, the indicia of 
impairment must be evaluated in their totality. It is an 
error of law to test individual pieces of evidence 
offered to establish reasonable grounds,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “In the composite 
circumstances of this case, that one 
factor [failure to trace the smell of 
alcohol to the accused’s breath] did not 
preclude a conclusion that there were 
reasonable grounds for his belief that 
[the accused’s] ability to drive was 
impaired.” The lower courts erred in 
ruling  there was an insufficient 
objective basis for the breathalyzer 
demand and the accused’s s. 8 Charter 
rights had not been violated. Since 
there was no Charter breach there was 
no reason to consider s. 24(2). The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction  for driving  with a blood 
alcohol level over 80 mg% was 
affirmed. 
 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
KNOWLEDGE THAT GUN LOADED 
INFERRED FROM 
CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Eastgaard, 2011 ABCA 152
Police had two vehicles under aerial 
and ground surveillance including  a 
Suburban which was occupied by 
the accused sitting  in the right front 
passenger seat. The Suburban was 
under constant surveillance from the time it left a gas 
station until it was stopped an hour later by a Tac 
Team. An officer conducting  aerial surveillance from 
a police helicopter saw the accused get out of the 
Suburban, approach some bushes and rocks where 
he crouched down for two to three seconds, and 
then get back into the Suburban and leave. After the 
police stopped the Suburban a member of the 
ground surveillance was directed to the exact spot 
the accused had crouched down and discovered a 
loaded, prohibited firearm (a handgun). At the time 
of his arrest the accused was the subject of three 
firearms prohibitions, was wearing  a bullet proof 
vest, and had been shot about two months before.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
judge found the only reasonable inferences to be 
“It is trite law that, in 
assessing whether the 
Crown has established 
reasonable grounds, 
the indicia of 
impairment must be 
evaluated in their 
totality. It is an error of 
law to test individual 
pieces of evidence 
offered to establish 
reasonable grounds.”  
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made were that the accused 
placed the firearm under the rock 
where it was found, that he had 
physical or actual possession of 
the gun and a substantial 
measure of control over it, and 
that he must have known what it 
was. The accused was convicted 
of possessing  a loaded firearm 
under s. 95 of the Criminal Code, 
among  other charges. He then 
appealed his conviction to the 
Alberta Court of Appeal arguing 
that the Crown did not prove that 
he knew the firearm was loaded. 
A majority of the Court of Appeal 
noted that a conviction under s. 
95 requires that the Crown prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew, 
or was wilfully blind, that the firearm was loaded. 
Mere recklessness is not enough. In order to prove 
knowledge it must be proven that the accused was 
aware that he had physical custody of the gun and 
that he knew it was loaded, coexisting  with an act of 
control. But “proving  actual knowledge does not 
require the accused to admit that the firearm was 
loaded,” said the majority. “Knowledge can be 
inferred from the circumstances if that is the only 
reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
evidence.”
In this case Justices Ritter and Phillips concluded 
that “the trial judge could infer that the [accused] 
knew the true nature of the firearm and that it was 
loaded from the manner in which [he] placed the 
firearm in the bushes”:
1) “The [accused] was under three firearms 
prohibition orders and did not have a 
licence or permit to own a handgun when 
he had possession of the handgun in 
question;
2) [He] had been shot just two months prior;
3) Both the [accused] and the driver of the 
Suburban were wearing bullet proof vests 
when they were arrested;
4)The [accused] deposited the firearm under 
the rock while under aerial and ground 
surveillance by the police; and
5)When recovered from the rocks by the 
police, the firearm was a fully functioning .
380 calibre handgun with 8  bullets loaded 
in the magazine.
Looking at this uncontradicted evidence and 
the entirety of the circumstances of this case, 
we are of the view that all of the indicia for 
knowledge were properly before the trial 
judge for him to conclude that the [accused] 
must have known what the gun was and that 
it was loaded. The facts show that the 
[accused] operated in a milieu in which he 
could be expected to be involved in 
confrontations and was no stranger to 
confrontations involving guns. In those 
circumstances, carrying a loaded firearm 
with full knowledge of that state is a logical 
inference to be drawn. 
.........
In the circumstances of this appeal, the 
[accused] was prohibited from possessing a 
firearm of any sort, had been involved and shot 
in an earlier shooting, and was armed regardless 
of the prohibitions. This suggests that he was 
prepared to deal with further shootouts. The 
benefit of using  a loaded firearm is obvious. 
[paras. 13-16]
The evidence was sufficient to support the inference 
that the accused had the requisite knowledge and 
that it was the only reasonable inference to draw 
from the circumstances. 
Justice Bielby, however, disagreed with the majority. 
In her view, the circumstantial evidence was 
insufficient to find the accused knew the gun was 
loaded. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
Note-able Quote
“Let’s say you go to dinner with a great manager;  most 
likely you come away thinking he is a great man. Yet, if 
you go to dinner with a great leader, you will come 
away thinking you are a great person. The difference 
being, of course, that a great leader makes you feel 
important, points out your strengths and empowers 
you… and a manager, not so much.” Author Unknown
“[P]roving actual 
knowledge [the 
firearm was loaded] 
does not require the 
accused to admit 
that the firearm was 
loaded. Knowledge 
can be inferred from 
the circumstances if 
that is the only 
reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the 
evidence.”  
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JIBC announces two new Graduate 
Certificates in Tactical Criminal Analysis and 
Intelligence Analysis
As law enforcement agencies struggle with limited resources, 
the need for improved crime and intelligence analysis has 
increased.  These new online graduate programs prepare both 
current and aspiring law enforcement professionals to design 
and apply strategies to solve modern problems that challenge 
crime and intelligence analysts daily.
The curriculum focuses on developing the skills required to 
collect and analyze crime data to forecast criminal profiles; 
documenting suspicious relationships between people, 
organizations and events; and using statistical techniques to 
solve crime.  Significant emphasis is also placed on the need to 
effectively and clearly communicate findings and prepare 
recommendations for decision-makers.
You will enjoy state-of-the-art learning resources; networking 
opportunities with employers in both the public and private 
sectors; and exposure to faculty with significant experience in 
the field.
Courses Include: 
• Intelligence Theories and Applications
• Intelligence Communications
• Advanced Analytical Techniques
• Tactical Criminal Intelligence
• Competitive Intelligence
• Analytical Methodologies for Tactical Criminal 
Intelligence
• Analyzing Financial Crimes
The Justice Institute of British Columbia (JIBC) is Canada’s leading public safety educator - a dynamic not-for-profit public 
post-secondary institution recognized nationally and internationally for innovative education in the areas of justice and 
public safety. The JIBC offers a range of applied and academic programs (certificates, diplomas, and degrees) that span the 
spectrum of safety - from prevention to response and recovery.
Specific entrance requirements 
are needed for admission to 
either certificate
Contact Us
Email
jpsd@jibc.ca
Phone
604.528.5590 or
toll-free 1.877.528.5591
Fax
604.528.5754
Mail
Justice & Public Safety 
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Justice Institute of British 
Columbia
715 McBride Boulevard
New Westminster, BC
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